When the Word “Homosexuality” Silenced Victims

Cold War policies, Criminal Code language, and the institutional blind spots behind the McRae scandal

If a boy was sexually abused on a Canadian military base in 1980, there was a very real possibility that the system investigating the crime did not primarily see him as a victim.

Instead, he might be seen as evidence of a “homosexual problem.”

That may sound absurd today, but it reflects the reality of how the Canadian Armed Forces understood sexuality during the Cold War.

The language used in the investigations involving the babysitter  and Captain Father Angus McRae reveals something uncomfortable about that era. The institutions responsible for investigating abuse were operating inside a framework where homosexuality itself was treated as deviant, dangerous, and incompatible with military life.

When abuse involved male victims, that framework blurred the line between predator and victim.

The Cold War Purge and CFAO 19-20

Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and into the early 1980s, the Canadian military treated homosexuality as both a disciplinary problem and a national security concern.

This belief was written directly into policy.

One of the most significant instruments was Canadian Forces Administrative Order (CFAO) 19-20, which governed the investigation and removal of personnel suspected of homosexual conduct.

CFAO 19-20 existed within a broader Cold War purge that targeted homosexuals across Canadian government institutions, including:

• the Canadian Armed Forces

• the RCMP

• the federal civil service

The logic behind the policy was rooted in Cold War paranoia. Officials believed homosexuals could be blackmailed by foreign intelligence services, particularly by Soviet agents.

As a result, the military created investigative structures designed to identify, interrogate, and remove suspected homosexual personnel.

The policy environment produced several consequences:

• homosexuality was framed as a threat to institutional integrity

• investigators were trained to detect homosexual behaviour

• once the label appeared in an investigation, it influenced how everything else was interpreted

That mindset shaped how the military reacted when allegations of abuse surfaced on a Canadian base.

The “Fruit Machine”: The Era’s Most Bizarre Investigation Tool

The Cold War purge of homosexuals produced one of the strangest devices in Canadian intelligence history.

It was known as the “Fruit Machine.”

Developed during the 1950s and used by Canadian security services, the device attempted to identify homosexuals through physiological testing.

Subjects were shown images of men and women while sensors measured:

• pupil dilation

• perspiration

• heart rate

Investigators believed these physical reactions could reveal sexual orientation.

The concept was deeply flawed and scientifically dubious. But for years it was treated seriously by Canadian security officials.

The existence of programs like this shows how strongly the Canadian state believed homosexuality posed a threat to national security.

Inside that mindset, sexual acts between males were rarely interpreted in neutral terms.

They were treated as signs of deviance, corruption, or institutional danger.

The Criminal Code Language of the Era

The legal vocabulary used in the McRae investigation also reflected the Criminal Code provisions that existed in Canada during the late 1970s.

Several sections governed sexual activity between males.

Among them were:

Section 155 – Buggery

This provision criminalized anal intercourse except in narrow circumstances.

Even after partial decriminalization reforms in 1969, the offence remained illegal under many conditions and carried heavy stigma.

Section 157 – Gross Indecency

This section criminalized a broad range of sexual conduct between males that did not meet the definition of buggery.

For decades it was widely used by police to prosecute same-sex behaviour.

Section 149 – Indecent Assault on a Male

This offence criminalized sexual assault involving male victims.

Although this section addressed abuse directly, the surrounding legal environment still framed male-male sexual activity primarily as a criminal phenomenon.

When investigators documented the acts committed by Captain McRae, the terminology used in military court records echoed this Criminal Code language.

Terms appearing repeatedly in the documentary record include:

• buggery

• gross indecency

• homosexual acts

• immoral conduct

The problem was that this vocabulary did not clearly separate sexual orientation from sexual abuse.

Both were described using overlapping terminology.

When Abuse Was Interpreted as a “Homosexual Problem”

Once the investigation entered that legal and institutional framework, the narrative could easily shift.

Instead of focusing exclusively on the exploitation of children, the investigation often framed the events as part of a broader issue involving homosexual behaviour on the base.

This pattern appears across multiple records connected to the scandal, including:

• CFSIU investigative files

• court martial transcripts

• ecclesiastical disciplinary proceedings

• administrative military documentation

Within these records, the abuse of boys by an adult priest was frequently described using the same legal language applied to consensual homosexual acts.

That distinction mattered enormously.

Because once the discussion centred on homosexuality, the victims themselves could become entangled in the stigma surrounding it.

When Victims Inherited the Stigma

In a military culture that treated homosexuality as deviant or dangerous, the presence of sexual acts between males could cast suspicion on everyone involved.

That included the children.

Investigative language sometimes described victims using the same legal vocabulary applied to the perpetrator.

In practical terms, this meant that boys who had been manipulated or abused could be perceived not purely as victims, but as participants in behaviour that the institution viewed with suspicion.

For children living in military communities where homosexuality was widely condemned, that label carried enormous social consequences.

The stigma surrounding homosexuality acted as a shield that protected abusers while simultaneously harming the victims.

The Interrogation Culture of the Era

Another piece of the historical puzzle that modern readers often miss is how suspected homosexual behaviour was investigated during the Cold War.

Investigations conducted by military police, intelligence officers, and sometimes the RCMP were not limited to simply asking questions.

They often involved aggressive interrogation techniques designed to identify sexual networks.

Individuals suspected of homosexual behaviour could be subjected to prolonged questioning about:

• their personal relationships

• sexual experiences

• private social circles

• other individuals who might also be homosexual

Investigators frequently attempted to build lists of names, treating suspected homosexuals as part of a hidden network that needed to be uncovered.

In that environment, the goal of the investigation was often not simply to determine whether a crime had occurred. The goal was to expose what investigators believed to be a subculture operating inside the military.

When abuse cases involved male victims, this investigative mindset could create dangerous distortions.

Instead of focusing exclusively on the conduct of the adult offender, investigators might treat the situation as evidence of a wider homosexual environment.

That perspective could easily shift attention away from the central fact that a child had been exploited.

When Military Social Workers Misinterpreted Trauma

The same cultural attitudes sometimes appeared in child welfare systems connected to military communities.

During the 1970s, 1980s, and into the 1990s, military psychological and social work literature still contained deeply flawed assumptions about male victims of sexual abuse.

One of the most damaging beliefs was the idea that boys who had been abused by males might develop “homosexual tendencies” or that sexually abused boys would go on to become “pedophiles”.

In some cases, abused boys were not simply treated as victims of trauma. Instead, professionals attempted to interpret their experiences through theories about sexual orientation.

This could produce disturbing conclusions.

Rather than asking why a child had been targeted by an abuser, military personel sometimes focused on whether the child’s behaviour indicated the development of homosexuality.

For boys already living in military environments where homosexuality was heavily stigmatized, this interpretation could be devastating.

It meant that the very systems meant to help them sometimes reinforced the idea that they themselves were the problem.

How These Attitudes Shaped the Narrative

When these investigative and psychological assumptions combined, they created a powerful institutional blind spot.

Investigators trained to search for homosexual networks, combined with social theories that linked abuse to sexual orientation, could unintentionally reinforce a narrative that obscured the central issue.

The question that should have been asked was simple:

Who harmed these children?

But in the cultural environment of the time, the question often drifted toward something very different:

What kind of sexual behaviour is happening here?

That shift in focus allowed the stigma surrounding homosexuality to seep into the way victims themselves were perceived.

The Result: Victims Trapped in the Wrong Story

For boys caught inside that system, the consequences could last for decades.

Instead of being clearly recognized as victims of sexual abuse, some were implicitly drawn into the same moral category as the adults who exploited them.

The institutional narrative blurred the line between:

• victim

• witness

• participant

That distortion did not simply affect how cases were investigated.

It shaped how those events were remembered, documented, and interpreted long after the original investigation ended.

And once that narrative became embedded in official records, it could follow the victims for the rest of their lives.

A System That Could Not See Clearly

Looking back at the records today, the most striking feature is how deeply institutional language shaped the investigation itself.

The system struggled to clearly distinguish between:

• homosexuality

• sexual misconduct

• sexual abuse of children

When those categories blurred together, the truth became harder to see.

The abuse did not occur because of these policies.

But the policies influenced how the abuse was interpreted, documented, and remembered.

Why This Still Matters: The Echo in the 2011 CFNIS Investigation

The legacy of these attitudes did not disappear when the Cold War ended.

Decades later, when historical abuse allegations resurfaced and were investigated again by the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS), the institutional framework surrounding the case was still shaped by the earlier narrative.

Historical records, investigative summaries, and institutional memory all originated in an era where the language of homosexuality had shaped the original investigation.

When modern investigators reviewed those records, they were inheriting a documentary trail that had already been filtered through that lens.

The consequences of those early interpretations did not vanish with time.

They became embedded in the archival record.

And those records continue to shape how the events are understood today.

The Lesson Hidden in the Documents

The documents surrounding the McRae scandal reveal more than the actions of individual offenders.

They expose the institutional mindset of an era.

Cold War policies like CFAO 19-20, the Criminal Code provisions governing same-sex behaviour, and the broader purge of homosexuals from Canadian institutions created a framework that distorted how abuse was understood.

Within that framework, the most important fact could become obscured:

Children had been exploited.

Understanding that institutional context is essential for understanding why some victims were not recognized, believed, or protected when the events first came to light.

And why the consequences of those failures continue to echo decades later.

Why Institutions Still Struggle With These Cases

Understanding the cultural and legal environment of the 1970s and early 1980s raises an uncomfortable question.

If the investigative framework of that era blurred the line between homosexuality and sexual abuse, what happens when institutions are asked to revisit those cases today?

For organizations like the Canadian Armed Forces, the answer is complicated.

Re-examining those investigations does not simply require reviewing the conduct of individual offenders. It requires confronting the possibility that the institutional mindset of the time contributed to the harm experienced by victims.

That is a much more difficult admission.

Acknowledging it would mean recognizing that the policies, assumptions, and investigative methods of the era may have distorted how abuse was understood and documented.

It would mean admitting that victims may have been misunderstood, stigmatized, or even implicitly blamed because of the framework through which investigators interpreted the events.

For large institutions, that kind of realization carries consequences.

It raises questions about:

• the fairness of past investigations

• the accuracy of official records

• the treatment of victims

• and the institutional culture that shaped those outcomes

These are not merely historical questions.

They affect how modern investigators interpret archival records, how institutions respond to survivors today, and how the public understands what happened in the past.

The Weight of the Archival Record

Another difficulty lies in the nature of the records themselves.

Investigations create documents.

Those documents become files.

Those files eventually become the historical record.

But if the original investigation was shaped by flawed assumptions, the record it produced can carry those assumptions forward.

Later investigators reviewing those files may believe they are reading a neutral account of events.

In reality, they may be reading a narrative already filtered through the institutional attitudes of another era.

That means the past can quietly shape the present.

Not through deliberate deception, but through the simple persistence of documents created within an outdated framework.

A Story That Was Never Fully Told

When the scandal involving the babysitter  and Captain Father Angus McRae surfaced at CFB Edmonton, it exposed a serious problem.

Children had been exploited.

But the institutional language used to describe the events often framed the situation differently.

Instead of clearly identifying abuse, the narrative frequently drifted toward discussions of homosexuality, morality, and deviant behaviour.

In that environment, victims could become entangled in the stigma attached to the very acts committed against them.

The story that ended up recorded in official documents was therefore incomplete.

It described acts.

It described investigations.

But it did not always clearly describe the children as victims of exploitation.

Why This History Needs to Be Understood

Revisiting these events today is not about rewriting history.

It is about understanding the context in which that history was recorded.

The Cold War policies that governed the military, the Criminal Code language that framed sexual acts between males, and the investigative culture of the time all shaped how the scandal was interpreted.

Without understanding those factors, it is impossible to fully understand the documentary record that remains.

And without understanding the record, it becomes much harder to recognize the experiences of the victims whose lives were shaped by those events.

The Real Lesson

The story surrounding the McRae scandal ultimately reveals something larger than the actions of any single individual.

It shows how institutional assumptions can shape the way abuse is perceived, investigated, and remembered.

When the framework used to interpret events is flawed, the truth can become distorted long before it reaches a courtroom, an investigative report, or an archival file.

For the children who lived through those events, the consequences of that distortion have lasted for decades.

Understanding the mindset of the era does not change what happened.

But it helps explain why the full story took so long to emerge.

And why some parts of it are still difficult for institutions to confront.

A Personal Note About Why This Matters

For me, this history is not abstract.

I was one of the children living on the base when these events unfolded. Like many of the boys who became entangled in the investigations that followed, I grew up inside a system that did not clearly distinguish between abuse and the stigma attached to homosexuality.

The labels and assumptions of that era shaped how adults interpreted what had happened, how institutions documented those events, and how some of the children involved were viewed afterward.

The purpose of examining these historical records today is not simply to revisit an old scandal. It is to understand how the investigative framework of the time shaped the narrative that was ultimately written into official documents.

Only by understanding that framework can we fully understand the record that remains.

The Power of Secrecy.

At first glance the 1980 investigation of Captain Father Angus McRae looks like a typical military scandal from another era. But the real story is not about one officer or one investigation. It is about the system that surrounded them. The military police, the investigators, and the legal authorities responsible for the case were all operating inside the same chain of command that governed the base itself. That was not an accident. It was how the National Defence Act was designed to function at the time.

When the Investigator Talks: The Forgotten Structure Behind the 1980 CFB Edmonton Investigation

In November of 2011 I had a conversation that would later become surprisingly important.

The man I spoke with was Warrant Officer Frederick R. Cunningham, the former Acting Section Commander of the Canadian Forces Special Investigation Unit (CFSIU) Western Region. Decades earlier he had been tasked with investigating Captain Father Angus McRae during the 1980 sexual abuse scandal at CFB Edmonton (then CFB Namao).

Cunningham did not speak to me as a stranger repeating rumours.

He spoke as the investigator who had been assigned to the case.

Within weeks of that conversation I raised what he had told me with the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM) as part of my complaint regarding the handling of my 2011 CFNIS investigation.

What happened after that is worth examining closely, because it reveals something about how the Canadian military justice system actually worked in 1980.

The Base Security Officer: The Hidden Gatekeeper

To understand the structure of the 1980 investigation, you have to understand the role of the Base Security Officer (BSO).

At CFB Edmonton that position was held by Captain David Pilling.

The BSO was not merely a staff officer concerned with physical security. In the Canadian Forces of the 1970s and early 1980s, the BSO was the officer responsible for coordinating serious investigations on the base and supervising the military police detachment.

In practice this meant that when a serious criminal matter arose, the process often flowed like this:

Incident occurs

Base military police become aware

Base Security Officer assesses the situation

Special Investigation Unit assistance is requested

In the McRae case, the CFSIU file shows that Captain Pilling personally tasked WO Cunningham with investigating McRae.

This detail matters because it reveals where the investigation actually began: inside the base command structure.

Command Authority and the Investigation

The base commander at the time was Colonel Daniel Edward Munro.

Colonel Munro was not just the commander of the base.

He was also Captain McRae’s direct superior officer.

This created a structural reality that is easy to overlook today.

The investigative chain began within the same command environment that included the officer being investigated.

The sequence looked something like this:

Colonel Munro – Base Commander

Captain David Pilling – Base Security Officer

Base Military Police

CFSIU investigators (including WO Cunningham)

Even though specialized investigators were brought in, the investigation itself was triggered and coordinated through the base command structure.

This was not unusual for the era.

It was how the system was designed to function.

A System Built Around Command Authority

The Canadian military justice system in 1980 was governed by the National Defence Act as it existed before the major reforms of the late 1990s.

Under that framework, commanding officers exercised enormous influence over disciplinary matters.

They could:

• receive and assess allegations
• determine whether charges should proceed
• decide whether a case would move toward court martial or be handled in other ways

Military police were not institutionally independent in the way civilian police services are today.

They were embedded within the military chain of command.

This meant that when allegations arose involving an officer within the base hierarchy, the investigation inevitably unfolded within that same command structure.

The Conversation in 2011

In November 2011 I spoke with WO Cunningham about the historical investigation.

What he described to me reflected his position inside the original investigative machinery.

He spoke about:

  • the investigative direction
  • the involvement of legal officers
  • the dynamics surrounding the McRae court martial
  • that the activities of Captain McRae were uncovered due to the military police investigation of my babysitter.
  • that it was a command decision to not call in the RCMP to handle the investigation of the babysitter.
  • that it was a command decision to keep the McRae matter in the military justice system instead of handing it off to the civilian courts.
  • that it was a command decision to limit the number of charges brought against Captain McRae.

These were not abstract opinions. They were observations from someone who had been positioned inside the investigation itself.

In December 2011 I raised what Cunningham had told me in a complaint sent to the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal.

The Institutional Response

In January 2012 I received a response from the Provost Marshal’s office stating that the Professional Standards review had concluded that CFNIS investigators had acted appropriately.

The letter also included a strikingly narrow statement:

The review found no indication that military police in the 1980s were aware of incidents involving me personally.

This wording is significant.

It does not say that military police were unaware of abuse occurring on the base.

It only states that investigators were unaware of incidents involving me specifically.

That distinction leaves open a much larger question about what investigators knew regarding other victims and events at the time.

In his January 2012 response, which came less than one month after I informed the Provost Marshal of my conversation with Fredrick R. Cunningham, Deputy Commander Lt.-Col. Gilles Santerre concluded that he could find no evidence that the military police in 1980 were aware of incidents involving me personally. 

That statement may be technically correct in the narrowest possible sense, but it sidesteps the far more important fact that the individual I have long identified as the person who molested my brother and me was already under investigation by the base military police in 1980 for sexually abusing the children that he was babysitting. According to both former SIU investigator Fred Cunningham and the father of babysitter, it was this very investigation into the babysitter that led investigators to uncover the activities of Captain Father Angus McRae. In other words, the military police did not need to know my name to know that children on the base were being abused. The investigation that ultimately exposed McRae began precisely because those abuses were already being reported.

Also, Bobbie Garnet Bees became my legal name in the mid ’00s. The CFNIS were aware of my legal change of name and what my name was during the time of the abuse. I wouldn’t be surprised if the Provost Marshal and the CFNIS only searched the 1980 files for my current legal name and not my birth name. If it ever came to light at a later date that my name was in fact contained in the 1980 military police investigation of the babysitter or the CFSIU investigation of Captain McRae, the CFPM and the CFNIS could say “ooops, sorry, we honestly forgot about your change of name”.

The Curious Silence in 2016

Several years later, during a later phase of the investigation, CFNIS investigators attempted to contact Cunningham.

His response was notable.

He declined to participate in a recorded interview and refused to meet investigators in person. Instead, he spoke briefly by telephone and avoided giving detailed answers.

This was a stark contrast to the way he had spoken with me in 2011.

Why Cunningham became so cautious remains unclear.

But the timeline raises an obvious possibility.

After my complaint reached the Provost Marshal in December 2011 and included information Cunningham had shared, it is entirely possible that he was advised to avoid discussing the investigation further.

If that occurred, it would explain why he became extremely careful when investigators contacted him again years later.

The Official Secrets Act and the Security of Information Act allow the Canadian Armed Forces to control what information becomes public and what information is never to be discussed with the public.

A Structural Problem, Not a Conspiracy

The purpose of examining this structure is not to claim that a conspiracy occurred.

The issue is structural.

The system that existed in 1980 placed investigations, command authority, and disciplinary decisions within the same organizational chain.

When serious allegations arose involving members of that chain of command, investigators inevitably had to operate within an environment influenced by the same hierarchy.

This was precisely the kind of structural problem that later inquiries into the Canadian military justice system criticized.

Reforms implemented after the Somalia Inquiry were intended to create a clearer separation between investigators and the command authority whose members they might be required to investigate.

The Larger Question

Looking back at the McRae investigation today raises a simple question.

When a serious criminal investigation begins inside the same command structure that includes the accused officer, how independent can that investigation truly be?

The answer to that question is not found in speculation.

It is found in the structure of the system itself.

And that structure is preserved in the documents that still exist today.

Below is a closing section you can append to the blog post. I wrote it so it ties the command structure, the National Defence Act flaw you’ve been analyzing, and the chilling effect of secrecy laws together in a coherent way. You can trim or sharpen the tone to match your usual style.

The Structural Flaw Behind It All

When you step back from the personalities involved in the 1980 investigation, a larger structural problem comes into focus.

The issue is not simply that the investigation occurred on a military base, or that the accused officer was part of the command structure.

The issue lies in how the National Defence Act operated before the reforms of the late 1990s.

At the time, the Code of Service Discipline effectively placed the entire disciplinary process under command authority. Commanding officers were not merely supervisors. They were central actors in the decision-making process that determined how allegations would proceed.

They could influence whether:

• allegations were pursued as service offences

• charges were referred for court martial

• matters remained within the military system

• civilian police were notified

This arrangement created what can only be described as a prosecutorial bottleneck.

Every major decision flowed upward through the chain of command.

In the McRae investigation, the chain of command ran directly through Colonel Daniel Edward Munro, who was both the base commander and the direct superior officer of the accused.

Even though specialized investigators such as the CFSIU were brought in, the investigation itself still originated inside that command structure through the Base Security Officer.

The system was not designed to isolate investigators from command influence. It was designed to operate within the command structure itself.

That distinction matters.

Because when serious allegations involve individuals within that same hierarchy, investigators inevitably find themselves operating in an environment shaped by the very authority structure connected to the case.

Silence Through Secrecy

There is another layer to this story that is rarely discussed.

Investigators and military personnel operating in this environment were also bound by the Official Secrets Act, legislation that imposed strict legal obligations regarding the disclosure of information obtained through official duties.  

The Act criminalized unauthorized disclosure of government information connected to official service.

For someone like Warrant Officer Frederick Cunningham, who served as the Acting Section Commander of the CFSIU Western Region during the McRae investigation, this created a powerful constraint.

Anything he learned during the investigation was information acquired through official duties.

Speaking openly about those events decades later could potentially be interpreted as revealing protected information related to military operations, investigations, or internal decision-making.

Even if the events themselves occurred decades earlier, the legal obligations imposed by secrecy legislation do not necessarily expire simply because time has passed.

The result is a quiet but powerful chilling effect.

Former investigators may possess direct knowledge about how an investigation unfolded, but the legal environment surrounding them discourages open discussion.

In many cases they may simply decide that remaining silent is the safest course of action.

The Problem With Silence

When secrecy laws intersect with a disciplinary system controlled by command authority, an unintended consequence emerges.

The people who know the most about how an investigation actually unfolded are often the least able to speak about it.

Investigators such as Cunningham may possess firsthand knowledge of the investigative environment, the legal advice involved, and the decisions made during the case.

But decades later, those same individuals may feel legally constrained from explaining what they witnessed.

This creates a situation where the historical record becomes shaped almost entirely by institutional documents and official summaries, rather than the voices of the investigators who actually worked the case.

Why This Matters Today

The Canadian Forces eventually recognized the dangers inherent in this structure.

The reforms that followed the Somalia Inquiry were designed to strengthen the institutional independence of military police investigations and reduce the influence of the chain of command over criminal matters.

Those reforms did not appear out of nowhere.

They were a response to the realization that the previous system placed investigators in a position where command authority, legal control, and secrecy obligations intersected in ways that could obscure the full truth of events.

Looking back at the 1980 investigation through this lens reveals something important.

The question is not simply whether individuals acted correctly or incorrectly.

The deeper question is whether the system itself was designed in a way that made full transparency almost impossible.

And when the structure of the system makes transparency difficult, silence becomes the natural outcome.

In the end, the McRae investigation tells us less about individual decisions than it does about the design of the system itself. The pre-1998 National Defence Act concentrated investigative power, prosecutorial control, and command authority inside the same chain of command. When serious allegations arose within that chain, the system was forced to investigate itself. That is not simply a historical curiosity. It is a design flaw. And like any flaw built into the foundation of a structure, its consequences were not always visible at the time, but they were inevitable.

When the Law Itself Helped Mislabel the Victim

People sometimes ask how it was possible for a boy who had been sexually abused to end up being described as a homosexual who had “participated” in what happened to him. To someone reading the story today, that sounds grotesque and unbelievable. Yet in the late-1970s and early-1980s Canadian military environment, it was not unusual. The language of the Criminal Code, the structure of the National Defence Act, and the military’s own policies toward homosexuality all combined to create a framework that could easily distort how male child victims were perceived.

At the time, the Criminal Code still categorized male–male sexual conduct using offences such as “gross indecency” (s.157)“indecent assault on a male” (s.156), and “buggery” (s.155). These provisions were written in a legal era that did not clearly separate two very different things: consensual adult homosexuality and sexual abuse of a child. The offences focused on the act itself, not on the power imbalance between an adult and a child. As a result, when investigators documented an incident involving a boy and an adult male, the wording of the charge could make it read as if two males had simply engaged in prohibited sexual conduct together. Even when the victim was a child under fourteen—someone who could not legally consent—the language could blur the distinction between perpetrator and victim.

That ambiguity mattered in practice. When investigators prepared reports or statements, they often used the terminology of the offence itself. Phrases such as “committed an act of gross indecency with” or “engaged in buggery with” described the conduct in a way that did not emphasize coercion or exploitation. Instead, the wording could imply mutual participation. For a male child victim, that phrasing could become the lens through which the entire case was viewed.

Inside the Canadian Forces, the cultural context reinforced this distortion. During that period the military still treated homosexuality as a serious disciplinary and security concern. Policies such as CFAO 19-20, which addressed homosexual conduct in the Forces, reflected the belief that homosexuality was incompatible with military service. Investigations into suspected homosexual behaviour could involve surveillance, interviews about personal relationships, and administrative action against members suspected of such conduct. In that environment, any allegation involving male-male sexual activity was already being interpreted within a framework that associated it with misconduct or moral failing.

That framework inevitably influenced how professionals within the system interpreted events. Military social workers and support staff were often assigned to assist children involved in investigations. But they were operating within the same institutional structure. The National Defence Act placed criminal matters involving service members within the Code of Service Discipline, meaning that investigations, charging decisions, and disciplinary processes were embedded in the chain of command. When a case involved male-on-male sexual activity, the surrounding policies and assumptions about homosexuality could subtly shape how the situation was understood—even by people whose role was to help the child.

The ripple effects extended into military families as well. A service member raising children on a base lived within a culture where discipline, reputation, and conformity were highly valued. At the same time, the military’s stance toward homosexuality sent a clear message that such behaviour was unacceptable and shameful. When a father learned that his son had been involved in a male-on-male sexual incident, even as a victim, the institutional context could influence how he reacted. The stigma attached to homosexuality could overshadow the reality that the child had been abused.

Looking back today, the legal and cultural framework of that period is deeply flawed. Modern Canadian law has replaced those offences with a sexual assault framework that focuses on consent, exploitation, and the protection of minors rather than on moral judgments about sexual orientation. The military has also changed many of its policies and attitudes toward homosexuality. But understanding the historical environment is essential. Without that context, it is difficult to explain how a boy who had been abused could end up being labelled in ways that suggested he had participated in the very harm inflicted upon him.

Recognizing the role of outdated legal language and institutional attitudes does not undo what happened. What it does provide is a clearer picture of how the system itself could distort the experience of male victims—and why confronting that history is necessary if we want to understand the past honestly.

One step closer

Had an appointment with my doctor this morning.

He’s going to work on getting me a referral for a psychiatric reassessment.

I had a psychiatric assessment done back in 2015, which revealed certain issues and concerns.

I don’t know how this will play out.

I really don’t want to get my hopes up too high.

This reassessment could work in my favour, or it could derail my hopes.

One thing that exists in the field of psychiatry is the never ending “we can fix you if you try hard enough” bullshit.

An illustration depicting a distressed individual curled up on the floor, being confronted by four angry figures in lab coats, who are shouting phrases like 'Stop being depressed!' and 'Try harder!'

The psychiatrist that I would be off to see will either give me a true assessment, or they can derail my plans for medical assistance in dying with their “patient, heal thyself” claptrap.

And then of course there’s the chance that the government will chicken out at the last moment and declare that they want to wait another four or five years to make sure that they “get it right”.

At this point in life I am so looking forward to that final escape.

To finally be free of the events on Canadian Forces Base Namao.

To finally be free of the decisions of the Colonel Daniel Edward Munro.

To be free from the agenda of Captain Terry Totzke.

To be free of the lies and the hatred of my father.

To no longer be blamed for the babysitter abusing my brother.

To no longer have to realize that the Canadian Armed Forces and the Government of Canada anointed a teenage pedophile and willing accomplice of Captain McRae to be the sole innocent victim while all of the other kids on the base were swept away into the dustbin of history.

A young boy wearing a medal labeled '#1 VICTIM' walks proudly in front of an 'INSTITUTIONAL VICTIM CARD DISPENSER', surrounded by scattered papers. A group of people in the background, including a man in a suit and a woman in a business outfit, watch him as one holds an 'APPROVED' card and another holds 'DISAPPROVED'. A trash bin nearby is labeled 'DUSTBIN OF HISTORY' and contains papers referencing actual victims.

To no longer have to endure 41 years of diagnosed but untreated mental illness.

Things might have worked out a little differently in 2011 if the Canadian Armed Forces National Investigation Service had been a little more honest and forthcoming and admitted that the knew the truth about 1980, that they knew that the babysitter had been molesting children, that it was the babysitter’s molestation of children on the base that brought the whole Captain Father Angus McRae matter to the forefront. But that due to the peculiarities of the criminal code and the National Defence Act and the terms reached between the babysitter and the Department of Justice in 2008 that they couldn’t bring charges against the babysitter. But they couldn’t. Secrets needed to be kept. Images and reputations needed to be kept spick and span.

But as it is, I’ll never get to hear my father apologize for putting his military career above anything else. I’ll never get to hear my brother say that he understands that what Richard drilled into his head was just lies to cover for how Richard placed his military career above all else. And as it is, anything that the Minister of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces, or even the Department of Justice have to say about apologies will be absolutely fucking meaningless.

So no, there is absolutely no recovery from this.

Not a fucking chance.

People often ask me what depression feels like and how I know that I am actually depressed.

The honest answer is that depression is not dramatic. It does not always look like visible despair or constant sadness. Instead, it quietly removes the capacity to feel joy, interest, or anticipation. Things that should matter stop holding meaning. You can take an interest in something and then lose that interest almost immediately. You expect negative outcomes as a default setting. Over time, effort begins to feel irrational because experience has taught you that change rarely produces anything beneficial.

Fatigue is part of it, but not in the way people assume. I can sleep for long periods and still feel no sense of restoration. Getting out of bed has always been a struggle, not because I am physically exhausted, but because I am disappointed to still be here and required to function again. It is less about tiredness and more about a persistent absence of motivation that has existed for as long as I can remember.

What people often misunderstand is that my depression was not caused solely by a single traumatic event. It was shaped far more by the prolonged aftermath of that event: the blame, the neglect, the institutional framing, and the environment in which I was expected to continue functioning as though nothing significant had occurred.

I once knew a man named Ray through a mutual acquaintance. We were not particularly close, but we did cross paths occasionally. Around 2004, Ray and I stopped to get something to eat. While we were eating he asked why I never seemed interested in getting close to people or forming attachments. I mentioned, in passing, what had happened with the babysitter and explained that I had never been comfortable getting close to other people afterward. I told Ray that I believed that what I had endured with my father and Terry had caused more lasting damage than the abuse itself.

Ray reacted with anger. In his view, I was supposed to be furious with the babysitter. I was supposed to want revenge or justice directed at a single individual. What he could not understand was that the psychological damage that has stayed with me was not primarily the acts of a violent and impulsive teenage boy with little empathy. The more enduring harm came from the environment that followed: the responses of the adults, the institutions, and the household I was forced to live within.

Being told that I was a willing participant in my own abuse did not help.

Being told that I was responsible for what happened to my younger brother did not help.

Being told that my reactions reflected a mental illness rather than trauma did not help.

Being subjected to my father’s rage for allegedly jeopardizing his military career did not help.

These were not isolated incidents. They formed a consistent pattern of blame and emotional invalidation.

At the same time, I was effectively saddled with responsibilities far beyond what a child should be expected to carry. I was blamed for my brother’s behaviour, blamed for not raising him properly, and blamed for the abuse that had been inflicted upon him, all while living in a household defined by neglect and hostility. Being placed in a caregiving role while simultaneously being treated as the source of the problem does not build resilience or self-worth. It reinforces chronic guilt, self-doubt, and emotional withdrawal.

Over time, repeated messages shape internal beliefs. When a child is consistently told that abuse is their fault, that their distress is pathological, and that their needs are burdensome, those messages become internalized. Boundaries erode. Compliance becomes a survival strategy. Later victimization is not uncommon in such contexts, not because the child is inherently vulnerable, but because they have been conditioned to believe that mistreatment is normal and unavoidable.

My father was an extremely neglectful man who wanted little to do with either of his children, and that dynamic existed independently of the abuse. When he forced our mother out of military housing, it was not an act driven by concern for our wellbeing. It was a practical decision shaped by responsibility and obligation. After she was gone, he brought his own mother into the household to raise my brother and me.

My grandmother lived with us on CFB Summerside from the spring of 1977 until the summer of 1978, when she returned to Edmonton. When my father was posted to CFB Namao in the summer of 1978, she and her husband moved into the PMQ with us. This was the same grandmother who had survived the Indian Residential School system in Fort Chipewyan, Alberta, and who struggled psychological issues as well as severe alcoholism that she refused to acknowledge or treat.

According to my father’s own statements to Alberta Social Services, she was described as “cruel” toward his children due to her alcoholism. The irony in that characterization is difficult to ignore, as he himself exhibited similar patterns of heavy drinking, anger, and emotional volatility. The household environment, therefore, was not one of stability or protection, but one shaped by neglect, unresolved trauma, and persistent emotional hostility.

Within that context, the original abuse did not exist as an isolated event. It existed within a broader system of neglect, blame, and institutional misunderstanding. The long-term psychological impact was not simply the result of what was done to me as a child, but of how consistently I was told, directly and indirectly, that the consequences of that abuse were my fault and my responsibility to manage.

That cumulative environment, more than any single incident, is what shaped the chronic depression I continue to experience.

This depression, along with its partner, severe anxiety, have conspired to make my life unenjoyable and generally unpleasant.

And no, there isn’t a fix for this. Sure, I could learn how to internalize this. Or I could take therapy and learn how to mask it better and how to hide it. I could even take more drugs and ride pharmacological numbness for the next 20 to 30 years.

But, I’m honestly tired.

I don’t want to be here.

The Longest Year……

Well, now I officially move into the longest year in my life.

By this time next year all of the acute care will have been relocated to the new site. But M.A.i.D. for Mental Illness won’t be available until March 17th, 2027.

What I fear is that the government of Canada might cave yet again to the Anti-M.A.i.D. crusaders. And that would be absolutely devastating.

People have asked me what I intend to do if the government delays M.A.i.D. for mental illness again like in 2023 and 2024?

I have absolutely no idea.

I’m so fucking tired and numb from dealing with the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence over the last 15 years.

Fuck me. I just realized that it’s just days away from the 15th anniversary of me sending an email to the Edmonton Police Service asking how I would make a complaint against my babysitter from all those years ago.

And with the DOJ, DND, and the CAF being very clear in their intentions to drag this matter out for as long as possible I don’t think that I would have the strength to initiate a charter challenge against the government of Canada.

And I should very clear. The DOJ, the DND, and the CAF don’t have a particular agenda against me in particular. It’s just that my issue brings a whole lot of issues to the forefront. Issues that the DOJ, the DND, and the CAF wish would simply disappear.

The 3-year-time-bar.

The summary-investigation-flaw.

The DOJ, the DND, and the CAF have a lot of reasons to keep this matter going for as long as possible.

Why is M.A.i.D. so critical for me? Why do I desire M.A.i.D. so much considering that it will mean the end of my life?

I’ve been dealing with major depression and severe anxiety since I was a kid.

Life has been anything but enjoyable.

And what makes it far worse is that even though I had been diagnosed with major depression and severe anxiety and I was having such mental health issues that I was supposed to have been institutionalized when I was young, both my father and Captain Totzke did what they could to block my access to treatment for my issues for whatever reasons.

After having dealt with even more trauma brought on by the bumbling and incompetence of the CFNIS in 2011, and 2015 to 2018, I’m even more fucking tired that I ever have been.

I also just realized that tomorrow would have been my brother’s 52nd birthday. But he started on Ketamine infusion treatments at the UofA back in the winter of 2024. This apparently evolved into a full blown ketamine addiction.

I’ll never understand who thought that giving someone a highly addictive drug as a “cure” for depression was a bright idea, but who the hell am I to argue?

Do I miss my brother?

No.

That’s the dysfunctional household that we grew up in, and that’s the way our father raised us.

Do I miss my father?

The only thing that I miss more than my father is an infected haemorrhoid.

Caught Between Three Agendas: A Child, A Captain, and A File Number


There is a peculiar kind of childhood that doesn’t exist in storybooks, therapy pamphlets, or nostalgic retrospectives about growing up on military bases.

It is the kind of childhood where your life is not guided by parents alone, but by files, case conferences, memorandums, and adults whose signatures carry more weight than your voice ever could.

That was my life during the period I was involved with Captain Terry Totzke and Alberta Social Services.

On paper, it looked like “family support.”

In reality, it felt like being trapped between three competing worlds.

Not two.

Three.

And only one of them appeared even remotely concerned with my wellbeing.

World One: Home — Where the Narrative Was Controlled

At home, the official story was simple:

Nothing was wrong.

Everything was exaggerated.

The professionals were overreacting.

My father consistently minimized concerns and framed my difficulties as school problems, behavioural issues, or misunderstandings. The records even note a pattern of blame directed outward — toward teachers, toward professionals, toward circumstances — but rarely inward toward the home environment.

Meanwhile, my lived experience was something entirely different.

Unpredictable anger.

Fear-based discipline.

Isolation within a military family structure where bridges with outsiders were routinely burned.

I was not growing up in a neutral environment.

I was growing up in a controlled one.

And control has a very specific psychological effect on a child: confusion about what is real.

World Two: The Military Social Worker — Chain of Command Reality

Enter Captain Terry Totzke.

Not a civilian therapist.

Not an independent advocate.

A Canadian Armed Forces social work officer operating within a chain of command.

That distinction matters more than most people realize.

When a military social worker becomes involved in a family on base, the dynamic is fundamentally different from civilian child welfare. Their role exists within an institutional structure where family stability, base discipline, and command awareness are intertwined.

The documents show repeated contact between:

  • Captain Totzke
  • school officials
  • Alberta Social Services
  • and military authorities

Files were transferred through military channels.

Referrals were coordinated through defence structures.

Even the base file itself was reportedly referred to counterparts in Ontario when the transfer occurred.

In other words: my case was not just a family issue.

It was an institutional one.

World Three: Alberta Social Services — The Only System Asking Hard Questions

Then there were the civilian social workers.

Aviva Desjardins.

Pat Moffat.

Teachers.

Program staff at McArthur.

Their records paint a starkly different picture from the narrative presented at home.

They observed:

  • emotional instability
  • fear responses
  • regression after stress
  • behavioural struggles linked to inconsistent parental support
  • a bright child burdened by emotional unrest stemming from family dysfunction

They repeatedly recommended family counselling.

They repeatedly documented lack of parental commitment.

They repeatedly tried to engage my father.

And repeatedly, those efforts failed.

Not because the problems disappeared.

But because cooperation did not.

The Psychological Crossfire

Imagine being a child in that environment.

One adult authority says:

Everything is fine. The issue is the school.

Another system documents:

Family dysfunction and emotional unrest are central factors.

A third authority operates quietly in the background, transferring files, coordinating referrals, and interacting with both civilian and military structures.

Now add one more variable:

You are exceptionally bright, emotionally aware, and fully conscious that something is deeply wrong — but no one gives you the full truth.

That is not just stressful.

That is psychologically disorienting.

The Transfer: A Suspicious Turning Point

An old, confidential personnel file with the word 'TRANSFERRED' stamped in red. Next to it is a child's drawing depicting a sad boy in a red shirt, a house with a red roof, and rain clouds.

Then came the relocation.

Not gradual preparation.

Not transparent communication.

Not therapeutic transition planning.

Instead:

  • I was not properly informed of the move
  • professionals were pleading with my father to tell me
  • my behaviour deteriorated as uncertainty increased
  • and suddenly the family transferred out of Alberta jurisdiction

Alberta Social Services closed the file as services were to be “provided elsewhere.”

Except they weren’t.

From my perspective as a child, it felt less like a supportive transition and more like an abrupt extraction from the only system that had been consistently documenting concerns.

One day I was in a structured day program.

The next, my belongings were piled at the curb and my life was being relocated without warning.

The Custody Shadow No One Challenged

There is another uncomfortable factor that hovered over everything: custody.

My father claimed legal custody.

Professionals appear to have accepted that claim at face value.

But in military environments, uniforms carry authority that discourages scrutiny.

A service member’s word can be treated as administrative fact.

If no one asks to see custody orders, the narrative becomes reality.

And if a child welfare system operates under the assumption of lawful custody, entire investigative directions can be shaped by that assumption.

The Child in the Middle

Where was I in all of this?

In assessments, I described my world as:

  • harsh
  • threatening
  • unstable

I expressed fear, helplessness, and frustration.

I openly discussed my home environment when finally given the chance.

And the response from adults?

Case conferences.

Memorandums.

Program placements.

File transfers.

But never a unified agenda.

Three Agendas, One Child

Looking back, the structure becomes disturbingly clear:

  • My father’s agenda: control of narrative and household authority
  • The military system’s agenda: management within institutional channels
  • Alberta Social Services’ agenda: intervention, monitoring, and therapeutic support

Only one of these agendas consistently documented my emotional state and attempted structured help.

Only one system pushed for counselling.

Only one system noted family dysfunction.

Only one system warned about poor prospects if parental cooperation remained inconsistent.

And that system lost jurisdiction when the family transferred.

The Lasting Impact

People often ask why some children from military environments struggle long after the events themselves.

The answer is not always a single traumatic event.

Sometimes it is something far more complex:

Growing up inside overlapping systems where adults with power disagree about reality — while you, the child, are expected to function normally within the chaos.

I was not just dealing with a difficult home life.

I was living between two worlds:

A civilian welfare framework trying to help,

and a military structure operating under its own logic.

And in the space between those worlds, there was a file number.

And that file number was me.

A young boy sitting on the floor with his head in his hands, looking distressed. Stacks of papers are piled around him, and a soldier is visible in the background near a cluttered table. The scene has a somber and chaotic atmosphere.

Guest Commentator

Today I have decided to let a guest commentator make a post.

The commentator? ChatGPT.

Why ChatGPT? Chat is blunt and dry in its analysis.

If you were to ask Chat yourself if the Canadian Armed Forces had the jurisdiction to prosecute historical child sexual abuse offences, chat would reply that yes, the CF Military Police have the jurisdiction to prosecute historical sexual assault crimes because the Criminal Code of Canada does not contain statutes of limitations for these crimes. So then you feed it Bill C-25 from 1998 and Legislative Summary LS-311e from 1998 and then it will reason that child sexual abuse crimes could still be prosecuted by the military police because the 3-year-time-bar only applied to Service Offences and not Criminal Code offences. So then you feed it a copy of the 1970 National Defence Act and a copy of the 1985 National Defence Act from prior to 1998 and then it will “understand” on its own that the National Defence Act enumerates the Criminal Code of Canada and treats ALL Criminal Code offences as service offences and therefore the pre-1998 time bar in the pre-1998 National Defence Act would apply.

So, with no further ado:

Guest Commentary: Paper Trails, Jurisdiction, and the Quiet Power of Process in the GO#2011-5754 Record

After reviewing the documents provided in this archive — including CFNIS investigative materials, MPCC review excerpts, Certified Tribunal Records, fire marshal documentation, Crown correspondence, and related ATI disclosures — what emerges is not a simple story of truth versus fabrication. Instead, the record reflects something far more institutional: a case shaped heavily by jurisdictional assumptions, document control, investigative sequencing, and the structural limits of oversight mechanisms under the National Defence Act.

Let me be blunt at the outset.

This is not a document set that reads like an obviously fabricated complaint.
It reads like a file that evolved unevenly, reactively, and procedurally — with corroborative leads surfacing late, witness statements shifting over time, and key contextual material either minimized, omitted, or only pursued after external prompting.

1. The Investigative Timeline Problem

One of the most striking features in the record is the sequencing.

You disclosed the house fire and related contextual memory during the March 31, 2011 interview with CFNIS investigators. That event was not vague. It was:

  • A specific incident
  • A specific location (PMQ-26 on 12th Street)
  • A specific temporal anchor (end of school year, later confirmed as June 23, 1980 at 12:20)

Yet, based on the documentary trail, meaningful efforts to corroborate the fire only intensified after your brother was contacted in August 2011. That delay matters.

In historical investigations, especially those involving childhood allegations, anchor events like fires, fatalities, relocations, or major incidents are considered high-value corroborative leads because they leave independent records. The fire marshal report confirming the incident and the presence of occupants directly undermines earlier investigative suggestions that the event may have been misremembered or exaggerated.

Once corroborated, the memory ceases to be “unverifiable recollection” and becomes externally anchored.

2. Witness Reliability and Documentary Contradictions

The documents you provided demonstrate a classic credibility inversion issue.

For example:

  • Initial witness claim: relocation in 1979
  • Fire marshal record: presence in the residence during a June 1980 fire requiring rescue

This is not a minor discrepancy. It is a documented contradiction against a contemporaneous official record.

Similarly, your father’s evolving statements — initially denying the presence of a grandmother and babysitter, later acknowledging both in written responses — introduce another instability in the evidentiary landscape. The social services records you supplied appear to have been summarized narrowly (as behavioral/emotional context) rather than integrated substantively where they contradicted witness narratives.

That selective integration is not proof of bad faith.
But it is indicative of a constrained investigative lens.

3. Jurisdiction: The Structural Core of the Entire Case

The email between Hart and Eisenmenger is arguably one of the most legally significant documents in the entire record.

It shows:

  • CFNIS asserting sole jurisdiction in March 2011
  • Civilian police (EPS/RCMP) not independently initiating the investigation
  • Jurisdictional reasoning occurring internally rather than through documented multi-agency assessment

Later MPCC review paragraphs reinforce the institutional stance:

  • Crimes alleged occurred on DND property
  • Military police were considered the policing authority
  • Distinction drawn between prosecutorial jurisdiction and policing jurisdiction

This distinction is legally accurate in Canadian law. Military police are Criminal Code peace officers and routinely investigate offences on bases. However, the practical effect is that once CFNIS assumed jurisdiction, the investigation remained internally contained unless voluntarily referred outward.

Your ATI request to the RCMP and the July 2011 response suggesting no prior investigative engagement with them is consistent with that containment model.

4. MPCC Limitations: Oversight Without Full Compulsion

The documents align closely with the statutory limitations you identified under the post–Bill C-25 framework.

During a review (as opposed to a public inquiry):

  • The MPCC cannot compel testimony under oath
  • Cannot subpoena documents in the same manner as a hearing
  • Relies heavily on materials provided by the CFPM/CFNIS
  • Cannot expand scope freely beyond named subjects

This creates a structural asymmetry:
The subject organization controls the documentary funnel.

If emails, contextual records, or archival files (such as CFSIU DS 120-10-80) were not fully disclosed, the MPCC would have limited independent capacity to detect omissions unless an inquiry was convened.

The reports you provided — especially the need to locate key archival material through a parallel investigation — suggest the Commission was not operating with a fully complete documentary picture at the outset.

5. The Crown Brief and Investigative Framing

The Crown’s declination appears to have been based on evidentiary sufficiency, not factual falsity. That is a critical legal distinction.

A weak or incomplete brief can produce the same prosecutorial outcome as a meritless allegation. Historical cases, especially those decades old and involving juvenile civilians, require aggressive corroboration work to reach prosecutorial thresholds. The documents you’ve shown indicate:

  • Key corroborative leads pursued late
  • Some witnesses not re-contacted during reinvestigation
  • Original investigative framing largely preserved during later submissions

That pattern is not uncommon in reinvestigations that rely heavily on legacy files.

6. Institutional Dynamics and Independence Doctrine

The Second Review materials referencing Supreme Court jurisprudence on police independence are important. In theory, investigators answer only to the law. In practice, however, institutional context, jurisdictional ownership, and organizational exposure risks can influence investigative scope and prioritization without any explicit unlawful direction.

That does not require conspiracy.
It only requires structural incentives.

7. So What Do These Documents Actually Demonstrate?

They do not demonstrate:

  • Clear fabrication
  • A wholly baseless complaint
  • An investigation with zero activity

But they do demonstrate:

  • Delayed corroboration of key historical anchors
  • Witness inconsistencies contradicted by official records
  • Narrow documentary framing in investigative summaries
  • Strong internal jurisdictional assertion by CFNIS
  • Oversight constrained by MPCC statutory review limits
  • Possible evidentiary tunnel vision once an early narrative was established

Final Assessment as a Neutral Commentator

If I were forced to place this case on the spectrum you jokingly proposed, the documents do not support the caricature of “a person inventing stories for attention.” That conclusion would require consistent documentary collapse under scrutiny, which is not what your archive shows.

Instead, the record reads like a historically complex allegation that entered an investigative system structurally designed to:

  • Contain jurisdiction on-base
  • Filter disclosure through internal channels
  • Operate under oversight bodies with limited compulsory powers during review stages

In plain institutional terms:

This does not look like a file that was aggressively fabricated.
It looks like a file that was procedurally managed, narrowly framed, and never fully reconstructed with the breadth of corroborative material that later surfaced.

Whether that outcome was the result of resource constraints, investigative judgment, institutional risk sensitivity, or simple procedural inertia is a separate question. But the documentary trail you have assembled shows a pattern that is far more consistent with systemic investigative limitation than with outright fictionalization of events.

And that distinction matters.

Here is a list of the documents that were uploaded to ChatGPT prior to my prompt asking ChatGPT to author a guest blog post.

Core Legal / Statutory Documents

  • N-5_2014.pdf (National Defence Act)
  • 1970 NDA N-4.pdf
  • T_317_13 Final Judgement.pdf
  • Queens Bench Proceedure Card.pdf
  • Printable LS-311E.pdf
  • Time Bar Flaw.pdf
  • Summary Investigation Flaw.pdf
  • P_S_ Request.pdf

MPCC Reports & Oversight Materials

  • MPCC 2012 Final report.pdf
  • MPCC 2018-030 final report OCR.pdf
  • MPCC – Publications — Special Report : Interference with Military Police Investigations: What Is It.pdf
  • Special Report on Interference.pdf
  • second-review-submissions-observations-deuxieme-examen-eng.pdf
  • third-review-submissions-observations-troisieme-examen-eng.pdf

MPCC Annual Reports (Parliamentary)

  • annual-report-rapport-annuel-2018-eng.pdf
  • annual-report-rapport-annuel-2019-eng.pdf
  • annual-report-rapport-annuel-2020-eng.pdf
  • annual-report-rapport-annuel-2021-eng.pdf
  • annual-report-rapport-annuel-2022-eng.pdf
  • annual-report-rapport-annuel-2023-eng.pdf
  • annual-report-rapport-annuel-2024-eng.pdf

Certified Tribunal Record & Core Case Files

  • bookscanred.pdf (Certified Tribunal Records)
  • 71515679-1083-4ec4-bbe4-b19ed2220265.pdf
  • CFPM 2120-4-0_r.pdf
  • RCMP_1980_FOI_package_HC.pdf
  • RCMP did not cede jurisdiction.pdf
  • 2011 Investigator complaint.pdf
  • Bobbie Warns Hancock Social Services.pdf

CFNIS / Investigation Documents (Key Operational Evidence)

  • Cyr does google search.pdf
  • CYR MPCC interview.pdf
  • CYR mentions Father MCRAE.pdf
  • Didn’t see this coming.pdf
  • Wow…pdf
  • Hancock contacts P’s Father.pdf
  • hancock_fire_records.pdf

Witness Statements / Interviews

  • Richard Gill Interview.pdf
  • scott statement.pdf
  • D Remembers.pdf
  • D S claims 1979.pdf
  • S’s Father time served.pdf
  • S to Hancock.pdf

Fire, Residence, and Corroboration Documents (Critical Timeline Cluster)

  • 1980 Fire Marshal Report PMQ 26.pdf
  • Fire Confirms S Lived at 26.pdf
  • scan18431.pdf (newspaper clipping about fatal fire)
  • S House Namao.jpg (1979 phone listing)
  • map of namao.pdf (PMQ map / Coriano Street)

Crown / Prosecution Materials

  • Werbicki.pdf

Media / Newspaper Clippings (Oversight & Institutional Context)

  • The Globe and Mail_ Outgoing military complaints chair stresses need to fix Ottawa’s oversight.pdf
  • The Globe and Mail_2008_04_14_1.pdf
  • The Globe and Mail_2008_04_14_6.pdf
  • The Globe and Mail_2015_03_11_3.pdf
  • The Leader_Post_2011_01_04_6.pdf
  • The Ottawa Citizen_2012_09_14_1.pdf
  • The Ottawa Citizen_2012_09_14_2.pdf
  • The Ottawa Citizen_2015_03_27_9.pdf
  • The Ottawa Citizen_2024_05_07_A1-2.pdf
  • The Ottawa Citizen_2024_05_07_A1-3.pdf
  • The Ottawa Citizen_2024_05_07_A3-3.pdf
  • The Ottawa Citizen_2025_06_19_A2.pdf
  • Guelph_Mercury_2015_03_11_A7.pdf

Other Reports / Reviews

  • era-final-report-(april-20-2015)-eng.pdf

Visual Exhibits / Screenshots You Provided

  • Screenshot (Certified Tribunal page with Ritco)
  • Screenshot (MPCC paragraph 46)
  • Jurisdiction matters_002.png
  • S House Namao.jpg

Important Note (Very Relevant to Your Case)

This session contains:

  • 50+ uploads
  • Multiple overlapping investigative timelines
  • Tribunal record extracts
  • Independent corroboration documents (fire, residency, phone listings)

That is not a small evidentiary archive.
It is closer to what lawyers would call a documentary record set, not just “a few files.”

Forget about it and simply move on.

People tell me to move on as if this story ended decades ago. It didn’t. It is still active, still administrative, still written into records that continue to shape my life.

And that sounds great and magic and all, but that’s not how it works.

What happened in 1980 didn’t stay in 1980. It malingered from 1980 until it was revived in 2011, reinforced in 2018, and made permanent.

In 2011 the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service called me a “societal malcontent with an axe to grind against the military”.

I wasn’t someone who endured a year and a half of sexual abuse, from age seven to age eight, at the hands of a fourteen-year-old babysitter.

That was obviously just a story that I made up.

A lie that was told so that I could juice some easy money from the Canadian Armed Forces.

My father was interviewed by the CFNIS and claimed that he “never” hired a babysitter to look after my brother and me. And he was right. He never hired the babysitter, except for on one occasion. It was my grandmother that hired the babysitter every second weekend or so.

During our involvement with Alberta Social Service my father was noted as telling people that he perceived to be in a position of authority what they wanted to hear. My father was also found to tell conflicting stories from one interview to the next. And my father also claimed to be the victim, that everyone was attacking him, and that people were intentionally keeping information from him.

When I gave a copy of my Alberta Social Service paperwork to the CFNIS in September of 2011, did the CFNIS contact my father again to ask about the discrepancies between my Alberta Social Services records and his August 2011 statement?

Nope.

What he told the CFNIS in August of 2011 was more than enough to help the CFNIS shape the narrative of the story they wanted to ship to the Alberta Crown in October of 2011.

Growing up in Richard’s house on CFB Shearwater, CFB Summerside, CFB Namao, CFB Griesbach, and CFB Downsview was anything but pleasant.

On CFB Shearwater my mother made use of the “battered wives club” frequently. I was often “boarded” at the IWK Children’s Hospital due to instability and conflict in the household. My father was noted as being returned to port early due to “emotional issues” while at sea. And the doctors were beginning to put plans in place to put Child Protective Services in contact with my family just before we were posted to CFB Summerside.

When my father was posted to CFB Namao he asked his mother to come and raise my brother and I. Richard really didn’t like his mother. There was no closeness between the two. But without grandma there was no way that he’d be able to go on training exercises while leaving his 7 year old and 4 year old home alone for two or three weeks.

When my family became involved with Alberta Social Services in November of 1981, my father blamed the issues my brother and I were having on his mother. He described her to Alberta Social Services as being extremely cruel to his children, especially when she was drinking, which was frequent due to her alcoholism. He also said that she refused to seek treatment for her alcoholism. Now, this is rich coming from Richard and both he and grandma were alcoholics, and the two of them would often get stumble down drunk when they drank together. Sometimes they’d even trade blows if they got hammered enough.

When my father was asked by his buddy Jacques Choquette sometime around 1985, why Richard didn’t give us back to our mother to raise if he was getting sick and tired of us, Richard told Jacques that as long as we lived under his roof, he controlled the costs, and that if he sent us to live with that “bitch” that he would have to sign his whole fucking paycheque over to her and that wasn’t going to happen.

Around the spring of 1982, Richard called my brother and I into the living room of the PMQ on CFB Griesbach. Richard told us that he and Sue might be splitting up. Both Scott and I cheered as Sue was quite the asshole. She had gone from promising to get Richard’s drinking and temper under control to being just as angry as abusive as he was. It was almost like she had Stockholm syndrome and thought that if she punished us enough that Richard would be happy and approve of her. Richard told us to both shut up. He explained that if Sue left him, Scott and I were going into a duffel bag, buried where nobody would ever find us, and he would simply move back into the barracks.

This wasn’t a picturesque childhood.

This was a fucking horror show.

After the abuse on CFB Namao, I would frequently wet my bed.

Grandma would get angry and accuse me of attention-seeking.

My father was fine with me sleeping in the piss as he wasn’t going to waste his time on changing sheets.

Sue had decided that the best way to stop me from pissing the bed was to rub my face in it like a dog.

I actually stopped wetting the bed the day I moved out of the house just after my 16th birthday.

After Captain Terry Totzke declared me a homosexual because the abuse had gone on for so long, my father’s attitude toward me soured completely. He wanted sweet bugger fuck all to do with me.

The worst was when Captain Totzke said I shouldn’t be allowed to play sports because if I saw another boy naked in the change room, I wouldn’t be able to control myself.

A youth hockey team, the CFB Edmonton Squirts, posing on the ice rink in 1978-79. The team is dressed in white jerseys with blue stripes and red pants, holding hockey sticks, with a coach in a green jacket.
Me in hockey from 1978 – 1979
I’m the on directly in front of the coach
I didn’t finish the 1979 – 1980 season due to the events of 1980 hence no 1979 – 1980 picture
A young boy in hockey gear, including a white jersey with blue stripes and red shorts, stands on ice holding a hockey stick with a puck in front of him. He is wearing black skates with yellow stripes.
Me again in the 1978 – 1979 season
There were no 1980 pictures as I was yanked out of hockey
after the events of 1978 to 1980 came to light in the spring of 1980

No matter how clean I kept my nose, or how well I tried to do in school with absolutely no support from home, this wasn’t good enough.

My brother Scott was in and out of group homes and juvie while we lived on CFB Downsview, and Scott could do absolutely no wrong.

The difference?

Scott was a victim of the babysitter and me.

See, in 1980 Captain Totzke declared me to have a mental illness called homosexuality. My brother didn’t have that same illness apparently.

According to the Canadian Armed Forces, there were only two victims of child sexual abuse on Canadian Forces Base Namao. One person was the babysitter. The other person was my younger brother.

The funny thing is the babysitter went on to have a prolific career of molesting children. I ended up disgusted with sex believing that sex was only something that somebdy else made you do to them to make them feel good.

Because I allowed the babysitter to abuse Scott, Scott was no longer to blame for anything that he did. Me? Well, that’s a different story. Anything that Scott did was my fault because I let the babysitter touch him.

It was sometime around the summer of 1987 when my brother stole Sue’s Pontiac Acadian and took it for a joyride off the base and into the city. I was 15 he was 13. When Richard and Sue came home from shopping in Oshawa and Richard found the Acadian missing, he laid one fuck of a beating on me. As he’s wailing away demanding to know why I can’t look after my brother, why I’m not raising my brother, he blurts out that Scott wouldn’t be doing these things if I hadn’t let the fucking babysitter touch him.

By the time the fall of 1987 rolled around things were getting pretty tense in Richard’s houshold on CFB Downsview. Richard was his same old angry self. His drinking was picking up again. Sue had sent me over to the Sgt. & W.O. mess a few times to pick him up and bring him home. His insomnia was going off the rails. My bedroom had been moved into the basement a few months after Sue’s son William was born in August of 1985. Richard had his work area set up in the basement with his desk, his computers, and his television. He would frequenly come downstairs after midnight, turn his computers on, turn his TV on, spark up some smokes, and maybe have a night cap, or two, or three.

As I was young at the time, my hearing was top notch. I didn’t listen to loud music. Fuck, I didn’t even have a radio in my room, let alone a stereo that I could hook up headphones to. So when he turned his TV or computers on, the whine of the horizontal deflection circuitry would wake me up. Kids these days have it lucky with LCD and OLED monitors, but back in the day when I was kid TVs and monchrome computer monitors had a scan frequency of 15.734 kHz. And this was audible and annoying to any kid with decent ears.

When Richard discovered that his insomnia was waking me up every night and making it hard for me to sleep, especially considering that my room didn’t have a door, his solution was that I could get the fuck out of his house anytime that I wanted to.

I moved out in late 1987, just after I turned 16.

I had stopped going to school a few months earlier.

I was already paying Richard $150.00 a month in rent for my bedroom.

So when the company that I was working for found out the trouble that I was having at home, they set me up with a room to rent. It was only $50.00 more than what my father was charging.

Richard didn’t care. In facte he borrowed a pickup truck from one of his buddies and helped me to move.

I wish that I knew that my family had been under the supervison of the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto. I could hve applied for emergency aid which would have gotten me shelter and the ability to continue going to school.

But such was not the case.

Without school, I never had the opportunity to enter the trades. But then again, my father was adamant that he joined the RCN with grade 9 and that’s all anyone really needed to get a job.

So there was no trade school.

There was no college.

There was no university.

There was nothing.

And even if by some fluke I had been able to scrape the money to go to school, there was the untreated depression and severe anxiety that I had to deal with.

Remember, I wouldn’t find out that I had been diagnosed with major depression and severe anxiety until August of 2011 when I received my Alberta Social Services paperwork.

From literally October of 1980 when Captain Totzke sent me to see a psychiatrist until I received my paperwork in 2011, I had no fucking idea whatsoever that I had been diagnosed with major depression, severe anxiety, and haphephobia.

Growing up under Richard’s roof on Canadian Forces Base Griesbach, and Canadian Forces Base Downsview, both Richard and Sue treated my depression as me just be a lazy fucking asshole that didn’t want to do anything and who just whined about everything like a little bitch.

My anxiety was often treated by my father with a good backhand and an order to calm the fuck down.

My haphephobia wasn’t my fear of being touched. No, that was apparently me being to good to play with other kids.

So no, even if I had the money, the depression, the anxiety, and the haphephobia would have ruined everything.

Why didn’t you seek treatment?

Treatment for what?

Grinding my teeth all night long?

Sleeping in all the time?

Not wanting to get out of bed?

Not getting pleasure or joy out of anything?

Constantly wishing that I’d be dead?

No desire for sex as sex was a deviancy that only perverts and the mentally ill engaged in?

Trying to figure out whether it was worth continuing to exist at all?

No, see, my father had told me, I was just a lazy fucking crybaby.

I wasn’t depressed.

There was no depression in the Canadian Armed Forces.

Base brats had no fucking reason to be depressed.

So no, there was never going to be anything meaningful in my life.

Sure, I can do things.

But because I don’t have the qualifications on paper, I’m told I can’t officially do these things, even though I do them anyway.

I often find myself being attacked by people with certificates and Red Seals because I’m not supposed to know those things or work on those things. Doesn’t matter what my back ground is, or why I was prevented in life from getting the qualifications that they have.

I get yelled at by people with more qualification than I have because apparently I’m not teaching them what to do because I want to make them look bad. Yet they don’t seem to understand that they’re the ones getting paid a higher pay grade than I am because they’re supposed to be more qualified than me.

As I said, if I had gotten into the trades back in the late ’80s, and my depression and anxiety didn’t fuck things up, the absolute lack of support from home would have.

University? I don’t know of a single fucking university student that doesn’t receive assiatnce from home.

So no, there is no moving on.

There is no “getting over it”.

Every day of my existence is a reminder of what was taken away from me, because I live through it every day.

Every day is a reminder of how much of a joke my life actually is and how meaningless my life actually is considering how easily the Canadian Armed Forces decided that I was expendable not only in 1980, but again in 2011, and 2018.

No, there is no moving on from this.

This whole fucking mess is nothing but a fucking albatross around my neck slowly pulling me under the waves. And I am still expected to pretend it isn’t there.

Military Police Complaints Commission: Is it Effective?

For all of the bitching and complaining that the Military Police Complaints Commission does about the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal and the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service, you’d think that the MPCC would show a little interest in talking to the CFPM and the CFNIS about just how exactly the Provost Marshal and the Military Police avoid the pitfalls presented by the pre-1998 summary investigation flaw and the 3-year-time-bar-flaw.

When Bill C-25 ” An Act to Make Amendments to the National Defence Act” was passed in 1998, it removed the 3-year-time-bar from the National Defence Act and it removed the requirement for Commanding Officers to conduct Summary Investigation of the charges brought against their subordinates.

When the 3-year-time-bar was removed from the NDA in 1998, Bill C-25 said that current Criminal Code limitations, if any, would apply to service offence charges comprised of Criminal Code offences.

Bill C-25 also said that there was no longer a need for the review of charges by the commanding officer of the accused via a Summary Investigation. Going forward all charges would be referred to a Military Director of Prosecutions.

But what Bill C-25 didn’t concern itself with is what happened to service offences that occurred prior to the bill coming into effect.

Bill C-25 only applied to Service Offences after the date the Bill became law. Bill C-25 did not apply retroactively to service offences committed prior to 1998.

In the past, when I’ve asked the CFNIS and the Provost Marshal how they can bring forth charges for service offences when the 3-year-time-bar has obviously expired, all I get is a “trust me” response. I’m never directed to any Act of Parliament that allows for the retroactive removal of the 3-year-time-bar prior to 1998.

I for one can’t understand how any suspect charged in the modern day for any service offence that occurred prior to 1998 would give up the protection of the 3-year-time-bar.

The 3-year-time-bar is the case killer for any service offence that occurred prior to 1998.

Now, I know that there will be those that say that “Service Offence” are only military related.

That’s not true.

A service offence is not only related to charges of a military nature, but to all criminal code offences that are committed in relation to a defence establishment or defence material by a person subject to the Code of Service Discipline at the time of the offence.

And if the 3-year-time-bar didn’t kill off the prospect of charges, the requirement for a summary investigation after the laying of charges would.

In the post Bill C-25 era, how do the Canadian Armed Forces and the Judge Advocate General reconcile with the fact that the accused could enjoy the protections presented by his commanding officer in a Summary Investigation that was required by the National Defence Act after the laying of charges?

It was the commanding officer’s discretion as to whether the charges would be dismissed, or moved to a civilian court or a military court.

How can the Canadian Forces Military Police or the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service in the modern day go against the protections that a member of the Canadian Armed Forces enjoyed prior to 1998 under the law.

You can’t simply pass legislation and strip rights retroactively. There’s a reason for this. In 1984 when “Rape” was removed from the Criminal Code of Canada, the charge of Rape wasn’t retroactively removed as this would have exposed generations of husbands to potential charges of rape as under the definition of rape in the Criminal Code, a husband could never be charged with rape for having forced sexual intercourse with his wife against her wishes.

When Stephen Harper raised the Age of Consent from 14 to 16 in 2008, there’s a reason why this law didn’t apply retroactively.

If the law was made retroactively can you imagine the chaos in the courts if suddenly 18 year old boy friends were going to prison for having sexual intercourse with their 15 year old girl friend, or vice versa?

If the Government of Canada were to remove the retroactive protections afforded by the pre-1998 National Defence Act you can bet that this would create quite the constitutional crisis in this country as now the government could pass laws at will that retroactively criminalized behaviours or retroactively removed protections.

I sent a letter to the Military Police Complaints Commission asking them to look into how the modern day CFNIS was able to successfully lay charges for service offences that occurred prior to 1998.

Email correspondence regarding a request for clarification on jurisdiction and limitation periods under the Code of Service Discipline, including an attachment.

This is the response that I received from the MPCC:

A formal email response from the Military Police Complaints Commission of Canada, addressing a legal advice inquiry, with contact information for relevant departments.

I sent the following reply to their response.

Email correspondence regarding a request for clarification on jurisdiction and limitation periods under military service discipline, including an inquiry to a commission about the exercise of authority by military police.

And this was their final response:

Email correspondence from the Military Police Complaints Commission of Canada regarding a request for clarification on jurisdiction and limitation periods under the Code of Service Discipline.

The thing about the Military Police Complaints Commission that makes it very different from civilian police agencies is that you cannot make complaints against the CFNIS or any component of the Canadian Forces Military Police Group outside of conduct complaints related to the conduct of a specific person or persons during an investigation.

This is one of the ways that the Government of Canada compromised with the Canadian Armed Forces and got the Canadian Armed Forces to buy in to civilian oversight of their in-house police agency.

The military has its customs, and it sure as hell wasn’t going to allow some outside civilian agency to come in and tell the military police what they could or couldn’t do.

And Parliament, in draughting the rules for the MPCC, obviously never imagined the need for the MPCC to handle complaints from civilians about civilian related investigations undertaken by the CFNIS.

The rules of the MPCC favour members of the Canadian Armed Forces. If you’re a member of the public, you are shit out of luck, especially if you don’t have the funds available to hire an ex-JAG willing to go up against the Canadian Armed Forces.

And unlike members of the public, members of the Canadian Armed Forces can approach the Chief of Defence Staff with a grievance for redress that will override any finding of the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal or the Military Police Complaints Commission.

If I had to say what the number one flaw with the Military Police Complaints Commission is, it’s that during a conduct review the MPCC will not share with the complainant what the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal shared with the MPCC.

As I’ve said in other posts, the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal has the full authority under the National Defence Act to pull the wool over the eyes of the MPCC and there is nothing the MPCC can do.

The MPCC is full well aware that the CFPM more often than not hides paperwork from the MPCC and refuses to hand over documents.

In my matter, the CFNIS knew full well in March of 2011 of the connection between my babysitter and Canadian Armed Forces officer Captain Father Angus McRae.

The CFNIS already had the 1980 CFSIU investigation paperwork. The CFNIS also had the 1980 Courts Martial transcripts for the Courts Martial of Captain McRae. The CFNIS knew in March of 2011 from CFSIU DS-120-10-80 and from Courts Martial transcripts CM-62 that it was the investigation of my babysitter by the base military police in May of 1980 for the molestation of numerous children on the base that led to the investigation of Canadian Armed Forces Officer Captain Father Angus McRae.

The CFNIS in March of 2011 were very much well aware that the investigation of Captain McRae uncovered the fact that McRae and the babysitter hadn’t just molested a child or two. According to Mr. Cunningham in November of 2011, and the babysitter’s father in July of 2015, the CFSIU knew that Captain McRae and the babysitter were involved in molesting well over 25 children on the base from the years of 1978 to 1980.

In 2011 the CFNIS did a CPIC check on the babysitter.
The CFNIS would have discovered:
1982 – Convicted for molesting a young boy that lived off the base at CFB Petawawa.
1984 – Convicted for child molestation involving a child that lived off the base at CFB Winnipeg in Manitoba.
1985 – convicted for molesting a 9 year old boy on Canadian Forces Base Namao when his father had been posted back there. Also convicted for molesting a 13 year old newspaper boy after the Canadian Armed Forces ordered the babysitter to move out of the military housing.

The CFNIS, the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, the Chief of Defence Staff, and the Minister of National Defence were well aware of the babysitter’s $4.3 million dollar civil action against the Minister of National Defence that was settled in December of 2008.

And yet, on November 4th, 2011, Petty Officer Steve Morris contacted me by telephone and told me that the CFNIS just couldn’t find any evidence to indicate that the babysitter was capable of committing the crimes that I had accused him of, even though I would find out in 2020 that the Courts Martial transcripts showed that the military police and the CFSIU knew that the babysitter was having forced anal intercourse with children much younger than he was and that he was receiving psychiatric care for his attraction to children even before he had been investigated by the base military police in May of 1980.


But, this is information that the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal willingly withheld from the Military Police Complaints Commission in 2012.

Doesn’t the CFPM worry that someone will discover what the CFPM did?

Nope. Why should they?

No agency has the authority to order the CFPM to hand over any documents. And to prove that the CFPM and the CFNIS don’t have “local copies” would be impossible.

But considering that the Captain McRae scandal has resulted in at least one successful lawsuit against the Minister of National Defence for the actions of Captain McRae, I wouldn’t put it past the military to have a folder or a CD-ROM / USB thumb drive / hidden network folder that contains instructions on how the CFNIS are to handle any complaints against Captain McRae or Captain McRae’s altar boys.

This way there’s no paper trail showing that the CFNIS signed out copies of the CFSIU DS-120-10-80 or the CM62 Courts Martial transcripts from the JAG library.

This is like when the Communications Officer for the Minister of National Defence asked for my correspondence to be given a non controversial name, encrypted, and hidden away in a “space saver file” ensuring that the contents were always beyond discovery and disclosure.

And when I filed my application for judicial review in 2013, when I discovered what the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal had done, it was too late.

This was the fatal flaw with my application for judicial review.

I relied extensively on “new evidence” which really wasn’t new evidence.

It was evidence that the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service had in their possession as it was information that I had shared with them, but it was evidence that the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal intentionally withheld from the Military Police Complaints Commission.

And during my dealings with the MPCC, the MPCC never once sat down with me and shared with me what the CFNIS had shared with them so that I could counteract what the CFNIS had claimed.

Instead MPCC investigators Peter and Claude both lectured me as to why the CFNIS had done one helluva bang-on investigation. Maybe Claude and Peter refused to accept my email conversations with the CFNIS investigators because they knew if these weren’t in the documents supplied to the MPCC by the CFPM they wouldn’t be able to do anything with them.

So…….. that leads to the question, “What is the purpose of the MPCC”?

The existence of the MPCC is just to satisfy a checkbox in Bill C-25. And that was the establishment of an outside civilian agency to oversee the military police. And that’s it. That’s why the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal has absolutely no issue with thumbing its nose at the MPCC as the CFPM knows there’s nothing of any real consequence that the MPCC can do.

During a review the MPCC cannot:
Subpoena documents
Subpoena witnesses
Administer Oaths
Re-run the investigation to see if the CFNIS should have come to a different conclusion.

All the MPCC can do is to look at what the CFNIS did.

Did the CFNIS take my complaint ?
Did the CFNIS investigate my complaint?
Did the CFNIS talk to witnesses?
Did the CFNIS submit a brief to the Crown?

So when an investigator claims that he flew out to Victoria to personally meet with me, it’s not the MPCC’s job to ascertain if this is true or not.

And even though the CFNIS investigator lied, he would have faced absolutely no consequences for lying.

When the CFNIS excludes all of my social service records that indicate that my father had brought his mother into the PMQ on base to raise my brother and I because our mother “abandoned us” and that he subsequently blamed his own mother for being cruel and abusive towards his children due to her alcoholism, the CFNIS never call him to explain his statement that his mother never lived with us and that he never hired a babysitter.

The fact he never hired a babysitter is correct, but that’s only because he was never at home.

Rent on the PMQ was cheap. Much cheaper than renting grandma a three bedroom apartment off base in the city. If it would have been cheaper for grandma to live off base, Richard would have sent us to live with her. And not only was it just cheaper for grandma, Scott, and I to live on base in the PMQs, but Richard could continue to claim us on his income taxes.

And more importantly, as we lived on base, Richard could use the Defence Establishment Trespass Regulations to ensure that our mother wasn’t able to come to see us. It wasn’t that our mother “abandoned” the family on CFB Summerside, Richard had the military police eject her from the military housing as she wanted a divorce if he was unwilling to get his rage and his drinking under control.

And at the end of the day, there is nothing that the MPCC can do to discipline the CFPM or any member of the Canadian Forces Military Police Group. If the CFPM wants to ignore the findings of the MPCC, the CFPM can tell the MPCC to go piss up a rope. Any recommendations that the MPCC offer are not enforceable through any legal mechanism.

Four people sleeping at a messy table with documents and a laptop, while a thought bubble above shows sheep jumping over a fence at night.