Historical Child Sexual Offences and Military Justice: A Critical Look

With Louise Arbour now appointed as Canada’s next Governor General, one of her most important recommendations on military sexual misconduct has returned to the centre of Canadian public life. Through Bill C-11, the Liberal government is moving to remove the Canadian Armed Forces’ authority to investigate and prosecute Criminal Code sexual offences committed in Canada, transferring that responsibility to the civilian justice system.

I am waiting to hear whether “Criminal Code sexual offences” will include historical child sexual offences that were never called sexual assault.

If you have followed my blog for any length of time you know the National Defence Act and the Criminal Code of Canada both contain language so vague that the snowbirds could fly wing-tip to wing-tip through the gaps.

This is not theoretical. On November 4, 2021, then-Minister of National Defence Anita Anand accepted Louise Arbour’s interim recommendation that sexual assaults and other Criminal Code offences of a sexual nature should be referred to civilian authorities. At the time, CFNIS had an active investigation into my complaint against retired Brigadier-General Roger Bazin. CFNIS refused to transfer the matter to civilian police on the basis that the possible 1980-era offences were not “sexual assault.” Their position was that sexual assault did not exist as a charge in 1980, while offences such as indecent assault and gross indecency did. Therefore, they treated the matter as outside Minister Anand’s transfer direction.

From 1950 until the 1985 Criminal Code transition, the National Defence Act excluded murder, manslaughter, and rape from trial by service tribunal when committed in Canada. And if you thought that “Rape” covered all sexual assaults against anyone, you’d be sadly mistaken.

Rape didn’t cover the following criminal code offences:

  • s. 146(1) Sexual Intercourse with female under 14
  • s. 146(2) Sexual Intercourse with female of previously chaste character age 14 to 16
  • s. 147 Attempted Sexual Intercourse with female under 14
  • s. 148 Sexual intercourse with “feeble-minded”
  • s. 149 Indecent Assault on female
  • s. 153 Sexual Intercourse with stepdaughter or female ward.
  • s. 155 Buggery
  • s. 156 Indecent Assault on male (often interpreted through a “homosexuality” lens by police, military, and social-work culture of the period)
  • s. 157 Gross Indecency (often interpreted through a “homosexuality” lens by police, military, and social-work culture of the period)

In the legal culture of the 1970s and early 1980s, Criminal Code ss. 155, 156, and 157 were not formally the offence of “homosexuality,” but they were commonly associated with male homosexual conduct, male sexual deviance, and “morals” policing. In institutional practice, that meant allegations involving male victims or male-male sexual conduct could be misread through a homosexuality lens rather than a child-protection or sexual-assault lens.


From 1985 until 1998, the National Defence Act excluded s. 271 sexual assault from trial by service tribunal when committed in Canada.

s. 271 Sexual Assault didn’t cover the following criminal code offences:

  • s. 151 Sexual interference under the age threshold
  • s. 152 Invitation to Sexual Touching
  • s. 153 Sexual Exploitation
  • s. 155 Incest
  • s. 160 Bestiality involving a child.
  • s. 170 Parent or Guardian procuring sexual activity
  • s. 171 Householder permitting prohibited sexual activity
  • s. 172 Corrupting children
  • s. 173(2) Exposure to person under age threshold

I asked ChatGPT what the key distinctions were between s. 271 and s. 151 – s. 173 were. This is what ChatGPT replied with.

The key distinction is this: sexual assault was the broad assault-based offence. Child-specific offences worked differently. Some required touching. Some required only invitation. Some targeted adults who procured, permitted, enabled, or exposed children to sexual activity. If the CAF only transfers files labelled “sexual assault,” then entire categories of child sexual offending can disappear into a jurisdictional crack.


Back on November 4th, 2021 then Minister of National Defence Anita Anand instructed all current sexual assault investigations and prosecutions to be handed over to the civilian justice system.

The CFNIS at the time had an active investigation into my complaint against retired Brigadier General Roger Bazin to ascertain if he was the man in the sauna that the babysitter took me to meet in order to pleasure the man in the sauna.

The CFNIS refused to hand this matter over to the civilian police citing that the offences that Bazin could potentially be charged with didn’t meet the definition of “Sexual Assault” as sexual assault didn’t exist in 1980, but that Indecent Assault and Gross Indecency were criminal code offences at the time of the alleged offence and therefore this matter was outside of Minister Anand’s instructions.

I asked ChatGPT the following question:

The Liberal Government of Canada just announced that they will formally remove ALL responsibility for investigating and prosecuting sexual assault from the Canadian Armed Forces and mandate that all sexual assault involving the Canadian Armed Forces be handled by civilian police.

As you know, the Canadian Armed Forces often investigated and prosecuted child sexual assault because rape typically wasn’t a crime that applied to children, nor did post 1983 sexual assault.

Do you believe that the Canadian Armed Forces will willingly hand over crimes involving children, especially pre-1998 crimes to the civilian system?

ChatGPT analyzed the question and came back with this response:

My honest read: not willingly, not cleanly, and not without pressure

Based on the current Bill C-11 material and the MPCC’s own concern about past transfer failures, I would not assume the CAF/CFNIS will naturally and generously hand over every file involving children — especially old, pre-1998 files — unless the statute, ministerial direction, civilian police demand, disclosure rules, and outside oversight make the transfer unavoidable.

That does not mean every individual investigator will act in bad faith. It means the institutional incentive structure still favours control. 🧱

What the new reform appears to do

Bill C-11 is aimed at removing CAF investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction over Criminal Code sexual offences committed in Canada and giving civilian authorities exclusive jurisdiction for those offences. DND’s own Bill C-11 material says this implements part of Arbour’s recommendation that Criminal Code sexual offences should be removed from CAF jurisdiction and prosecuted exclusively in civilian criminal courts, with civilian police investigating in Canada “at the earliest opportunity.”  

DND’s Arbour-response report is even broader in wording. It says all sexual assaults and other criminal offences of a sexual nature under the Criminal Code, including historical sexual offences, alleged to have been perpetrated by a current or former CAF member, should be referred to civilian authorities. It also says civilian authorities should exercise investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction over all sexual offences by CAF members.  

That wording matters because it does not just say “modern sexual assault under s. 271.” It says:

sexual assaults and other criminal offences of a sexual nature under the Criminal Code, including historical sexual offences

That should include child-specific sexual offences, at least in principle.

But here’s the trap: “sexual assault” is too narrow

You are right to flag the category problem.

Historically, especially before and around the 1983 reforms, many child sexual offences were not labelled “sexual assault.” They could be framed as:

EraPossible legal label
Pre-1983 / 1970 Codeindecent assault on female, indecent assault on male, buggery, gross indecency, sexual intercourse with female under 14, sexual intercourse with stepdaughter/ward, parent/guardian procuring defilement, householder permitting defilement
Post-1983 / 1985 Codesexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, sexual exploitation, incest, parent/guardian procuring sexual activity, householder permitting prohibited sexual activity, corrupting children, exposure

So if the transfer rule is interpreted as only “sexual assault”, then old child sexual abuse files can fall into a crack.

But if it is interpreted as “Criminal Code sexual offences” or “criminal offences of a sexual nature”, then the net is much wider. Bill C-11/DND materials use the wider language in key places.  

Why I would not trust voluntary handover

The MPCC has already identified the exact kind of institutional problem you are worried about.

In a 2023 public-interest-investigation decision, the MPCC described a complaint alleging that a ministerial direction to transfer sexual misconduct investigations from military police to civilian police was not implemented by the CFPM. The MPCC noted a disparity between Minister Anand’s 2021 direction, Minister Blair’s later statement that it was not intended that half of sexual assault files remain with military investigators, and the CFPM approach of involving victims in transfer decisions. The MPCC said this raised questions about civilian control of military policing.  

That is the smoke coming out of the second-storey window.

It shows the problem is not theoretical. There has already been a fight over whether the military police actually implemented the transfer direction fully.

The especially difficult category: historic pre-1998 child cases

Pre-1998 matters are the most vulnerable to institutional slipperiness because they can be argued into several boxes:

Possible CAF/CFNIS argumentWhy it matters
“This is historical and evidentiary.”Civilian police may be reluctant unless records are complete.
“This was handled under military justice at the time.”CAF may try to treat old records as military justice history, not fresh civilian criminal evidence.
“The suspect was subject to the Code of Service Discipline.”They may frame it as a service-tribunal legacy issue.
“The offence label was not sexual assault.”Child-specific or old sexual offences could be miscategorized.
“Civilian police declined / lack jurisdiction / lack records.”CAF can keep practical control if the handoff is incomplete.
“Records are archived, classified, privileged, or subject to privacy limits.”Disclosure becomes the bottleneck.

That last point is the big one. Jurisdiction on paper is one thing. Possession of records is another.

If CFNIS/DND still controls the old investigative files, notebooks, witness lists, Crown briefs, command correspondence, charge-screening records, and court martial material, then civilian jurisdiction can be starved at the source.

So would they hand over child files willingly?

My answer: only the files they are forced to define as transferable

I would expect easier handover where the case is:

  • recent,
  • clearly labelled sexual assault,
  • committed in Canada,
  • involving a CAF member,
  • already known to civilian authorities,
  • not embarrassing to historical command structures,
  • not tied to old military justice decisions.

I would expect more resistance, confusion, or narrowing where the case is:

  • pre-1998,
  • child-specific,
  • labelled under old offences,
  • tied to military dependants,
  • tied to PMQs/base institutions,
  • tied to chaplains, social workers, MPs, or command decisions,
  • connected to previous CFNIS/MPCC failures,
  • dependent on old CFSIU/CFNIS files.

That is not me being dramatic. That is how bureaucracies defend themselves: not usually by saying “no” loudly, but by defining the problem narrowly enough that the awkward parts fall outside the box.

The key phrase to watch

The reform must not be allowed to mean only:

“sexual assault.”

The phrase that matters is:

“all Criminal Code offences of a sexual nature, including historical child sexual offences, regardless of whether the historical charge label was rape, indecent assault, gross indecency, buggery, sexual interference, sexual exploitation, procuring, permitting, or another child-specific sexual offence.”

That is the language that closes the loophole.

Bottom line

Do I believe the CAF will willingly hand over historic child sexual offence files, especially pre-1998 ones?

No. Not as a matter of institutional instinct.

I believe they will hand over what the law, civilian police, courts, ministers, journalists, survivors, and oversight bodies make impossible to keep.

The reform is important. But without explicit language covering historical child sexual offences and mandatory disclosure of related military records, the CAF can still hide behind classification, offence labels, jurisdictional history, and “that was not technically sexual assault” nonsense.

That is the loophole. And that is where I would keep hammering.


Roger is dead.

Well, it looks like Roger Bazin will never have to own up to anything he may have done in the past. And sadly, that probably was not because of any great cunning or scheming on his part. Some of it likely had to do with the flaws in the pre-1998 National Defence Act. But some of it also appears to have had to do with the incompetence of the CFNIS.

Roger Bazin died on May 2nd, 2026

A portrait of Msgr. Roger Bazin, smiling, wearing glasses and a black suit jacket over a white clerical shirt, with dates of birth and death listed below.

Roger however had some skeletons from his military days. In June of 2009 the CFNIS launched an investigation into Bazin.

Newspaper article headline about a former military chief chaplain charged with sexual assault and historical details regarding the incident.
Article discussing allegations of sexual assault against retired brigadier-general Roger Bazin, a former military chaplain, highlighting the military's response and the implications for chaplain candidates.

And the complaint made against Bazin in June of 2009 wasn’t the only allegation that had ever been made against Bazin. In the early 2000’s a $24,000.00 payment was made to the family of a teen that had made allegations against Bazin.

Article discussing allegations against a military chaplain not reported to police, detailing statements from church officials and the affected family.

Remember that all of this was before the reviews of the military justice system by Madame Marie Deschamps and Madame Louise Arbour, both of whom found the military police and the CFNIS incapable of conducting proper sexual assault investigations.

I had made my own complaint against Roger Bazin in 2020.

This had to do with Roger Bazin having been dispatched from Ottawa to assist Captain Father Angus McRae with his affairs during the investigation and subsequent courts martial.

During the same period of time that Roger Bazin was on Canadian Forces Base Namao, the babysitter intercepted me in the change room at the base swimming pool and took me into the men’s sauna. Inside the sauna was an adult man I did not know. What happened there became part of the complaint I later made to CFNIS

I then performed oral on the guy until he was just about to ejaculate.

I never saw the man after that.

The CFNIS investigator who took my statement later interviewed Bazin. According to what I was told, Bazin denied being the adult man from the sauna incident. But he also apparently told the investigator that there were other matters he had been worried about being investigated for..

And no, the CFNIS made absolutely no attempt to talk to the babysitter to see if the babysitter would identify who that man was that he provided me to in 1980.

Roger Bazin died without ever having to fully answer, in public, for the allegations that followed him out of his military career and into old age. That is not proof that every allegation against him could have resulted in a conviction. But it is proof of something much uglier: when military institutions delay, deflect, minimize, or mishandle sexual abuse complaints, time becomes the accomplice. Witnesses die. Records disappear. Jurisdiction becomes a fog machine. And by the time anyone finally admits that the system failed, the person who should have had to answer the questions is already gone. Bazin did not need to defeat the system. The system appears to have defeated accountability for him.

RICHARD’S RAMPAGE

I can’t remember when exactly it occurred, but an Edmonton police officer came to grandma’s apartment during the summer of 1985.

The officer came into grandma’s apartment and talked to Scott and I by ourselves.

I can’t remember what exactly the officer was asking, but I do remember that he said that he had to see both my brother and I in person to make sure that we were okay.

Okay from what?

He wouldn’t say.

At the end of the summer Scott and I flew back to Toronto from Edmonton.

Richard picked us up from the airport.

He didn’t say a single thing. He just picked up our luggage and loaded it in the back of the Mustang and then we drove back to our PMQ on CFB Downsview.

As we were driving up Keele street and approaching the base Richard told Scott and I that when we got back home we’d have to wait in the dining room and wait for the military police to come talk to us.

When we got back on Stanley Green Park and into the PMQ we sat down at the dining room table.

The instant I sat down I noticed that something wasn’t right.

Sue’s dining room furniture was all wobbly.

This is furniture that you didn’t drag as you sat in it. And you sure as hell didn’t sit at this table unless you were eating.

Over half of Richard’s National Geographic magazines were missing.

The windows in the dining room were all new. The glazing putty was fresh and unpainted. I could see that there had been some large holes repaired in all of the dining room walls.

I snuck a quick peek into the living room.

All the windows had brand new glass.

Sue’s drapes were missing and replaced with the standard military issued roll shutters.

Sue’s stereo looked like it had been through hell and back.

Richard’s aircraft models were all missing.

Two military police officers arrived.

Both MPs came into the PMQ and instructed Richard and Sue to step outside while the MPs talked to my brother and I.

The military police asked Scott and I if the Edmonton Police Officer told us anything when he paid us a visit.

The MPs started receiving frantic calls from occupants of the other PMQs with reports of Richard throwing furniture through the windows and screaming and yelling.

The military police said that when they attended the PMQ neither Richard or Sue would explain where Scott and I were. The MPs said that they were concerned about the welfare of Scott and I as the neighbours had told the MPs about the way Richard treated Scott and I.

According to the MPs it took three military police officers to bring Richard under control on the evening of the dispute.

The amount of damage done to the PMQ was substantial.

The MPs asked Scott and I if we knew any reason for the dispute.

I don’t think Scott or I said anything to the MPs, but for Richard and Sue to snipe at each other or to slam doors and huff away from each other was nothing out of the ordinary.

The military police told us that if Richard ever lost his temper again that we should get out of the PMQ by any means possible. Even if we had to jump from the second story, just get out of the PMQ.

We should call the MP shack and have the MPs dispatched to the PMQ right away. But they cautioned us against from calling from inside our PMQ, that we should go to a neighbour’s PMQ and call the military police from there.

The MPs also cautioned us against calling the Toronto Police as this would waste time as the Toronto Police couldn’t just come on to the base without themselves going through the military police.

At the end of the meeting, the two MPs gave Scott and I each a pair of business cards with the number for the MP shack. They also made sure that we watched at they put a sticker on the kitchen telephone of CFB Downsview emergency contact phone numbers.

After the MPs left, Richard came in and told us to put our clothes away and to go outside and play.

Neither he nor Sue ever talked about this.

I found out much later in life that the military police never informed the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto about the domestic dispute. At the time the CAST had a file open on my family. My family had been assessed as a low risk case due to my father’s insistence that everything in the PMQ was okay.

I cannot prove motive from memory alone. But the practical effect was clear: the matter stayed inside the military policing system, while the civilian child-protection agency with an open file on my family was apparently left uninformed.

Life in the PMQ patches was a lot more rough and brisk than it was in civvy land.

What we accepted as normal inside the chain-link perimeter of the PMQs was not normal at all. The military police knew enough to warn two children how to escape their own home, but not enough — or not openly enough — to bring civilian child protection into the room.

Scott Found Deceased.

I had been asleep for maybe an hour on the evening of August 13th, 2024 when I received a knock at the door.

Two VPD constables were here on a “Next-of-Kin” visit at the request of a constable from the Edmonton Police Service.

One constable asked me if I had any idea as to why they were here. I said that it had to be a death in my family. I said that with my father deceased since 2017, my uncle deceased since 2010, that it had to be either my mother or my brother.

The same constable asked me what my brother’s name was and what his birthdate was. So I told him. He then said that he was sorry to inform me but my brother had been found badly decomposed in his apartment.

The constables left the contact information for the police constable in Edmonton that was looking after this case. I contacted her and she gave me information on how to contact the coroner to make arrangements for Scott’s body as the EPS hadn’t been able to find anyone else.

In talking with the caretaker it turns out that Scott had been receiving Ketamine Infusion Treatments at the University of Alberta for the major depression and anxiety that he had been suffering as a result of the events of both Canadian Forces Base Namao and growing up in Richard’s dysfunctional military household. The caretaker had mentioned that Scott had moved up from the infusion treatments at the UofA, to snorting Ketamine, to injecting Ketamine.

It wasn’t until a couple of weeks later that I remembered Scott had actually mentioned these treatments to me in some text messages.

A written message discussing personal health struggles, mention of a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder, weight loss, referrals to medical professionals, and treatment options for stress and seizures.
Screenshot of a message from a user named Scott discussing connections between CDS and Ketamine, expressing uncertainty about his findings.

And this was literally the last communications that I ever had with Scott:

Screenshot of a conversation discussing legal matters regarding representation in a lawsuit.

After Richard died in 2017 I think Scott had received some inheritance from Richard’s estate. I can only assume this as I was never contacted or received anything from Richard’s estate. I can’t come up with any other answer as to how he amassed enough money to buy condominium.

According to Scott, by late 2023 he had sold the condo at a loss and was instead renting the condo as an apartment from the new owners.

I had placed his sim card into my phone as the second sim so that I could receive text messages and phone calls to his number.

Nobody called on his phone line.

The only people sending him text messages were Telus, Bell Canada, CIBC, VISA, Mastercard, Walmart, his hosting services, and his domain name providers looking to have overdue debts paid off.

I made every effort to send his creditors his “Certificate of Cremation” and a letter attesting that Scott had no will, no estate, and no way to investigate if he had assets as there was no executor appointed for his estate. And I was not going to blow $10k in court fees for the pleasure of becoming his executor.

As mentioned, Scott had become addicted to ketamine.

It appears that he started off down the road of ketamine as a result of his major depression and his severe anxiety.

I don’t think Scott put any serious thought into how the evets of Canadian Forces Base Namao had harmed him until 2020 when the Deaprtment of National Defence finally released the 1980 Court Martial transcripts along with the 1980 CFSIU investigation of Captain McRae.

When this became a media story in late 2020 Scott and I still hadn’t talked since Richard stuck his hand into Scott’s brain back in 2013 the day before I went into my federal court hearing.

But seeing the newspaper stories, and seeing that the whole affair from 1978 to 1980 was so much fucking larger than me “allowing” the babysitter to molest Scott, must have rattled Scott’s cage.

Seeing the truth come out, and not having Richard alive to put his spin all over it must have really done something to him.

The coroner would only state that Scott’s death was due to a ruputred spleen.

Since about age age 10 Scott had been suffering from Grand Mal seizures.

Then there’s the fact that there was a fresh needle found on his computer desk.

It appears that he stood up from his computer desk, stood up as if to go to the washroom or maybe the kitchen, and dropped right there.

Was he too caresless with his ketamine dosage?

Did he have a final Grand Mal Seizure.

Or did he decide that what he was going through just wasn’t worth it anymore and he decided to take that one final shot?

We’ll never know.

On October 3rd, 2013 just prior to me heading into Federal Court Scott started bombarding my Facebook pages with all sorts of allegations about what I let the babysitter do to him, or how I encouraged the babysitter to do things to him, and how I could have stopped the babysitter if I wanted to.

A quick check of Scott’s Facebook page showed that Richard had paid him a visit the night before, and this was after Scott refused to talk to Richard or Sue since 2008 when he refused to attend the funeral of the son of one of Sue’s friends that Scott used to hang around with when he was younger.

November 29th, 2013 is the last time I had any communications with Scott until late 2020 when the DND finally released the court martial transcripts and the 1980 CFSIU investigation paperwork.

These are the last communications that I ever had with Scott.

So yeah, to me it looks like Scott crashed into a wall.

Depression, anxiety, trauma from sexual abuse, trauma from living in a dysfunctional military family, suffering sexual abuse at the hands of members of the Canadian Armed Forces such as Captain Angus McRae and his agent, being lied to by the Canadian Armed Forces and members of the Canadian Armed Forces like our father Warrant Officer Richard Wayne Gill. Having your welbeing interferred with by other members of the Canadian Armed Forces like Captain Terry Totzke.

This was a lot for anyone to handle.

Exploring Reykjavik: A Unique Iceland Experience

I was in Iceland from June 19th, 2023 until June 30th.

This was supposed to have been a bucket list thing, but unfortunately the federal government delayed Medical Assistance in Dying until March 17th, 2024.

When I landed at KEF this was the first time I had ever walked across the tarmac to catch a shuttle bus to get to the terminal. Turns out that because Reykjavik is a mid-flight stop for lots of flights going on to the UK or Europe it’s faster and easier to bring the planes close to the terminal on the apron, but not to pull up to a gate. That way once we’re on the shuttle bus and our luggage is off loaded, the plane can just power up and taxi out and take off right away.

Customs was fun going through. I don’t think the Icelandic customs agent has seen too many people with full facial tattoos.

Reykjavik is a nice walkable city.

Lots of things to just wander around aimlessly and look at.

A rusted car engine compartment with a small flower arrangement growing where the engine should be, highlighting the contrast between nature and decay.
2023 Trip to Iceland

I don’t know what the story was with this burnt out VW Van, but someone prettied it up with a flower pot of flowers.

A vibrant sunset over a landscape with a highway in the foreground, streetlights, and houses silhouetted against the colorful sky.
2023 Trip to Iceland

This was as dark as it gets in Iceland around the summer solstice.

Iceland is funny in the sense that you can wake up, look out the window, see a clear sky, and five minutes later there’s a downpour, and five minutes after that it’s windy, and then it’s back to sun.

A tattooed individual wearing a black hat stands near a rocky shoreline, with modern buildings and mountains visible in the background during sunset.
2023 Trip to Iceland

This picture was taken at about 01:00.

Taxes are high, but the streets are very clean as compared to anywhere in Canada. And they don’t have anywhere near the homeless problem that Canada has. It’s not that they don’t have unemployed or mentally ill, it’s that they take care of them. And yes, they have a drug problem like everywhere else, but their problem isn’t on public display.

When you have a healthy tax base you have healthy social programs. Low income housing is all over the place, but it’s well looked after. There are treatment facilities and housing for drug users. And for a small city like Reykjavik, they have a very decent public transit system.

Their bicycle path network and their walking paths are well done.

Expenses weren’t that horrendous. The Canadian penny is almost at par with the Icelandic Krona. That may sound odd, but 100 Krona equals 1 dollar Canadian. 1000 Krona equals 10 dollars Canadian.
A large pizza listed at 1875 Krona is literally only $18.75 CDN.

Heating is interesting.

Almost every house and business in Reykjavik is heated by a closed loop water system that is heated by the heat energy provided by the close proximity to the magma under Iceland. The water isn’t heated directly by the magma. The natural hot springs are. Massive heat exchangers take energy from the hot springs and transfer it to the water in the heating water loop. This loop is circulated all of the city.

Now, the truth.

Was this some spiritual trip that awakened something inside of me?

Nope.

It was nice going to Iceland and being left alone.

Understanding Medical Assistance in Dying: Myths vs. Reality

A nude woman sitting on the edge of a well, looking surprised or alarmed, surrounded by lush green foliage and stone walls.
La Vérité sortant du puits armée de son martinet pour châtier l’humanité(English: Truth coming from the well armed with her whip to chastise humanity) is an 1896 painting by the French artist Jean-Léon Gérôme.

The lies and misinformation surrounding Medical Assistance in Dying are quite stunning. And these lies prove one of the most significant downsides of the Internet is that lies, bullshit, and paranoia circulate much faster than the truth.

A group of five animated characters passionately shouting in protest, holding signs with phrases like 'Do your research!', 'Sheeple!', and 'Chemtrails!!'. They appear expressive and animated, standing against a bright blue sky with contrails visible.

And when the truth doesn’t suit their narratives, they just scream “Do Your Research”. And when someone does their research their response is often “Sheep! Do you believe everything they tell you?!?!?”

The most recent bullshit flying around the interwebs is that M.A.i.D. is the number #1 cause of death in Canada.

Here, from Stats Canada, are the leading causes of death from 2016 until 2023.

What must be remembered is that Medical Assistance in Dying is NOT the cause of death. It’s the mechanism. The cause of death is always the underlying disease.

From 2016 to 2023 there were about 663,600 deaths due to Cancer in Canada.

~65 – 70% of M.A.i.D. procedures are cancer-related

-but-

Only ~4 – 5% percent of terminal cancer patients seek M.A.i.D.

Stage 3 or Stage 4 cancer is not something that I would wish upon my worst enemy. And it should come as no surprise that the majority of M.A.i.D. procedures currently being performed are for patients with Stage 3 or Stage 4 cancer.

Why “Do Your Research” Isn’t About Research

It’s tempting to dismiss anti-intellectual movements as simple ignorance. That’s comforting—but it’s wrong.

What we’re seeing is a convergence of forces.

For many, these beliefs are tied to identity. Changing their mind isn’t just updating a fact—it’s risking their place in a community. Facts become secondary to belonging. Certainty becomes more valuable than accuracy.

Layered on top of that is a very human need for control. The modern world is complex, uncertain, and often frightening. Conspiracy thinking offers something simple: clear answers, clear villains, and the illusion of understanding. It trades nuance for emotional stability.

There’s also a deep and, at times, justified mistrust of institutions. Governments have lied. Corporations have failed. That history becomes a lens through which everything is viewed—even when the conclusion no longer fits the evidence.

But it doesn’t stop there.

Social media amplifies the loudest, most extreme voices. Echo chambers reinforce beliefs until they feel self-evident. And within that environment, a smaller but significant group of actors—grifters, influencers, opportunists—learn that outrage is profitable. Confusion becomes currency.

Not everyone shouting “Do your research” is acting in bad faith. Most are trying to make sense of a complicated world using the wrong tools.

But some are.

And the result is what we see now: a system where noise is rewarded, doubt is weaponized, and the appearance of confidence is mistaken for truth.

The Fear of Death.

One of the most powerful drivers of opposition to M.A.i.D. is fear—specifically, the fear of death and the belief that death represents failure.

For many people, death isn’t seen as a natural conclusion to life, but as something to be resisted at all costs. That perspective is often reinforced by deeply held beliefs about what comes after death, whether that’s an afterlife, reincarnation, or some form of continued existence.

Those beliefs can provide comfort, and for many, they do. But they are still beliefs—personal frameworks used to make sense of something fundamentally unknown.

When those beliefs become the basis for decisions about how others should live—or die—the conversation shifts. It moves away from the lived reality of the person who is suffering and toward a set of assumptions that cannot be proven or shared by everyone.

What we do know is this: when the brain ceases to function, the person as we understand them—their thoughts, memories, and consciousness—is gone.

And for some, facing that reality leads not to fear, but to a desire for control over how their life ends, especially in the presence of severe and irreversible suffering.

When the Debate Isn’t Just Ours

Canada’s conversation around Medical Assistance in Dying (M.A.i.D.) is often framed as a purely domestic issue—one rooted in Canadian law, Canadian values, and Canadian lived experience.

But that framing is becoming harder to maintain.

In recent years, there has been growing concern about the role of foreign influence in shaping public policy debates, particularly where those debates intersect with deeply held moral or religious beliefs. The M.A.i.D. conversation is no exception.

South of the border, the United States has seen a resurgence of politically active evangelical movements, many of which are closely tied to broader currents of Christian nationalism. These movements are not confined by geography. They are well-funded, highly organized, and increasingly international in scope.

That matters, because advocacy does not stop at the border.

Ideas, messaging strategies, and—critically—funding can and do move across jurisdictions. Organizations that oppose assisted dying on religious or ideological grounds often operate within networks that extend beyond Canada, drawing on shared resources, coordinated campaigns, and in some cases, financial support originating outside the country.

This does not mean that all opposition to M.A.i.D. in Canada is foreign-driven. It isn’t. Many Canadians oppose M.A.i.D. for their own reasons, and those views deserve to be part of the conversation.

But it does raise an important question:

To what extent is a Canadian policy debate being shaped by external actors with different legal frameworks, cultural contexts, and political objectives?

The concern is not belief. People are entitled to their beliefs, whether they are rooted in religion, philosophy, or personal experience.

The concern is influence.

When well-funded networks with explicit ideological goals engage in cross-border advocacy, the line between domestic discourse and imported agenda begins to blur. Messaging that originates in one country—where legal and social conditions are different—can be transplanted into another, often without that context being made clear.

In the case of M.A.i.D., that matters because the stakes are deeply personal. This is not an abstract policy question. It is about how Canadians choose to navigate suffering, autonomy, and the end of life within their own legal and healthcare systems.

If that conversation is being shaped—directly or indirectly—by movements that do not operate within those same systems, then transparency becomes essential.

Canadians should be able to understand not only the arguments being made, but where those arguments are coming from, who is funding them, and what broader objectives they may serve.

Less than a year now

A digital countdown timer displaying 'Medical Assistance in Dying' with a background of palm trees and a blue sky. The timer indicates 357 days, with the date set to March 17, 2027, and the current time displayed as 00:00.

Well, it’s less than a year now until Canada legalizes Medical Assistance in Dying when Mental Illness is the Sole Underlying Medical Condition.

That is unless government chickens out at the last moment and delays M.A.i.D. MI-SUMC again out of fear of the religious right in this country.

M.A.i.D. where mental illness is the sole underlying condition was originally set to be legalized on March 17, 2023. At the last minute, it was delayed to March 17, 2024, and then again in February 2024, pushed further to March 17, 2027.

Both times M.A.i.D. MI-SUMC was delayed because those who think that everyone should live their lives as per the dictates of their holy teachings managed to push narratives about abuse of the system and loss of safeguards that don’t reflect how the law actually operates.

If your religion says that you shouldn’t obtain M.A.i.D., then don’t obtain M.A.i.D. It’s that plain and simple.

An animated depiction of a majestic figure with a crown, emerging from clouds with a glowing background.
No M.A.i.D. for you!
Suffering is next to godliness!

It’s the same thing when your religion says for you to not eat shellfish, don’t eat shellfish. And if your religion is against gay marriage, then don’t marry your spouse of the same gender.

What I choose to do with my life is my decision and my decision alone.

I am not here for your personal comfort.

I am not here for you to score brownie points with your religious daddy figure.

It is not my job to keep trying mental health treatment after mental health treatment designed to show me how to hide my mental trauma so that you can feel comfortable about yourself.

Y’all had your chance to help back in 1980.

But instead you let the Canadian Armed Forces, the Archdiocese of Edmonton and their respective disciplinary systems handle Captain Father Angus McRae while all of his victims, with the exception of his accomplice, were swept under the rug to suffer in silence.

We only get one chance at this life. There are no do-overs. There isn’t a second time around. There is no lake of fire to burn in for eternity. There are no heavenly clouds to float on playing harps.

Sticking around for another 15 to 20 years is of no benefit to me.

If I want to die, that’s a calamity.

If society says that it’s okay for me to die for the convenience of others, then that’s okay.

If I got run over by a drunk driver tomorrow, there would be no great outcry of anguish. Nobody would be calling for significant restrictions on car drivers while driving while intoxicated. It’s a “free society”.

If I die in a plane crash due to some middle manager saving pennies by cutting back on the lubrication schedule for jackscrews, I don’t get to start over.

Existing for another 15 to 20 years just allows me to continue suffering from untreated depression, anxiety, and the non-stop memories of the horrors of CFB Namao and the aftermath just don’t really appeal to me.

When the Law Said Boys Couldn’t Be Raped

How misused language in modern reporting erases the reality of Canada’s pre-1985 sexual offence laws — and who they failed.

One of the most dangerous habits in modern crime reporting is the casual misuse of legal terms—followed by a refusal to correct them when challenged.

Recently, CTV news ran a story about the release of Darren Scott Ray from prison on a three-day pass.

The story mentions how Darren was convicted of “raping” Darren Pepin.

Headline about police monitoring a released murderer, expressing community concern, from CTV News, dated March 3, 2026.
News article about the release of convicted murderer Darren Scott Ray on a temporary absence permit in Oshawa, Ontario.

Sexual assault, especially sexual assault that results in murder, is horrific, but attaching the wrong labels can actually do more harm than good.

Rape only existed as a Criminal Code offence up to 1984. Rape was a very specific offence that primarily applied to intercourse with females where lack of consent had to be proven.

Also, you’ll note that a male could only be charged with rape so long as the victim wasn’t his wife.

Legal text defining rape and conditions of consent, presented in English and French.
A page from the Criminal Code detailing legal text regarding the quality of an act, specifically referencing false representations and fraud.
Text from a legal document discussing the punishment for rape and the attempt to commit rape, featuring sections 144 and 145 with penalties outlined.

Section 143 only dealt with females and it only dealt with consent. Rape was the preferred charge in instances where force, threats, or deception were used to obtain sexual intercourse with a female who was not the suspect’s wife. Under the old law it was assumed that when a wife made her wedding vows, she was giving permanent consent to sexual intercourse whenever her husband desired it.

Prior to 2008, the age of consent was 14. And under the pre-1985 criminal code rape wasn’t the only charge that could be applied.

Legal text discussing the penalties for sexual intercourse between males and females under the age of fourteen and between fourteen and sixteen, including definitions and conditions of culpability.

Section 146 (1) and Section 146 (2) define sexual intercourse of any type with a female under the age of 16 as being a criminal code offence, unless the girl was the man’s wife.

Section 146(2) introduced the concept of ‘previously chaste character,’ meaning prosecution depended on whether the complainant was considered ‘chaste’—a deeply problematic and now-discredited legal standard, and Section 142 (3) provided evidentiary avenues that allowed the defence to shift blame onto the complainant.

Charges under Sections 143, 144, 145 and 146 could be brought against an accused with section 146 serving as a sort of backup catch-all should the Crown fail to prove offences under sections 143, 144, and 145.

The maximum sentence for “Rape” was life imprisonment and a whipping.

The maximum sentence for “Sexual intercourse with female under 14” was life imprisonment and a whipping.

The maximum sentence for “Sexual intercourse with a ‘chaste’ female between the ages of 14 and 16” was 5 years in prison with no provision for whipping.

In 1983–1984, the offence of ‘rape’ was removed from the Criminal Code and replaced with a gender-neutral framework of sexual assault offences—marking a fundamental shift in how the law recognized victims.

Rape was replaced by the offence of ‘sexual assault’. However, there remained other offences that were not classified as ‘sexual assault’, and these offences not only applied specifically to children, but also sidestepped the inability of the Canadian Armed Forces to hold a service tribunal for Murder, Manslaughter, and Sexual Assault.

Legal text outlining sexual offences and consent laws, including exceptions and age-related criteria for charges.

Section 151 is sexual interference and applies specifically to victims under the age of 14 -no specified gender for the victim.

Text from a legal document outlining the definition and penalties related to sexual interference involving minors.

Section 152 is invitation to sexual touching and applies to crimes committed against victims under the age of 14 – no specified gender for the victim.

Legal text regarding the invitation to sexual touching, outlining offenses and penalties related to inviting a person under fourteen years of age to engage in sexual touching.

Section 153(1) is sexual exploitation and applies to crimes committed against “young victims” by a person in a position of trust or authority.

A section of legal text discussing the definition and consequences of sexual exploitation involving young persons.

Section 153(2) defines a “young person” as any person fourteen years of age or more but under the age of eighteen years, gender not specified.

Definition of 'young person': A legal definition stating that a 'young person' is someone aged fourteen years or more but under eighteen years.

Section 155(1) is Incest.

Legal text outlining the definition of incest and associated punishments, including specifics on relationships and defenses.

Section 159(1) deals with Anal Intercourse.

Text from a legal document discussing laws regarding anal intercourse, including definitions of offenses and exceptions for consensual acts between adults.

Section 160(1) is committing the act of bestiality in the presence of a person under the age of fourteen, or incites a person under the age of fourteen to commit bestiality – no specified gender for the victim

Legal text regarding bestiality, outlining the offenses, penalties, and implications for those involved.

The following sections are those classified as ‘sexual assault’ and from 1985 until 1998 the Canadian Armed Forces could not hold a service tribunal for these offences.

Section 271 is sexual assault – no specified gender for the victim

Section 272 is sexual assault with a weapon, threatens a third party, or causes bodily harm, again no specified gender for the victim

Section 273 is aggravated sexual assault. And again, gender is not specified.

Why does this matter? Because words have real-world implications.

When the wrong legal label is applied, it doesn’t just distort history—it obscures how the law actually operated.

Text discussing legal limitations on certain offences, including murder, rape, and manslaughter, in both English and French.

I have had to deal with people who were utterly convinced that the Canadian Armed Forces could not have subjected Captain McRae to a court martial for sexual offences involving children as the Canadian Armed Forces were prohibited from holding a service tribunal (summary trial or court martial proceeding) for the criminal code offence of “rape”.

Under the pre-1985 Criminal Code:
Boys could not be raped.
Rape was defined as a crime against females.
That was the law.

And what charges was the military precluded from conducting a service tribunal for?

Legal text regarding limitations on trying certain serious offences, including murder, rape, and manslaughter, in military service tribunals, presented in English and French.

But there were alternative routes for prosecution involving females under the age of 16.

All the commanding officer of the accused had to do during the prescribed summary investigation was to dismiss the rape charge(s) that had been brought against their subordinate while allowing charges under sections 146(1), 146(2), 150(1), and 153(1) to proceed to court martial proceedings.

  • s.146(1) Sexual Intercourse with Female under 14
  • s.146(2) Sexual Intercourse with Female 14 to 16
  • s.150(1) Incest
  • s.153(1) Sexual Intercourse with Step-Daughter or Foster Daughter
  • s.155. Buggery
  • s.156 Indecent Assault of Male
  • s.157 Gross Indecency

Sections 155, 156, and 157 always applied to sexual crimes involving male children. This meant that the Canadian Armed Forces could keep these in house and try them through the military justice system. There was almost no opportunity for sexually abused male children to have their matters heard in civilian courts.

One of the most troubling aspects of the pre-1998 National Defence Act was that prosecutorial functions within the military justice system were exercised by officers within the chain of command, rather than independent civilian Crown prosecutors, raising serious concerns about legal expertise and independence.

Text from a legal document discussing the proposed changes to sections 160 to 162.2 of an Act, regarding the commencement of proceedings and the authority of commanding officers in military disciplinary matters.
Legislative Summary LS-311E (1998)

Now I have a much better understanding as to why the DOJ, the DND, and the CAF are fighting against the sexually abused victims of one of their officers.

This is not about a single case. It raises a far more uncomfortable question: how often did commanding officers quietly redirect or narrow charges in ways that limited accountability?

And once you understand how the law actually worked, the question is no longer whether this could happen—but how often it did.

Because if that happened more than once, the issue isn’t individual failure—it’s systemic design.

When the Word “Homosexuality” Silenced Victims

Cold War policies, Criminal Code language, and the institutional blind spots behind the McRae scandal

If a boy was sexually abused on a Canadian military base in 1980, there was a very real possibility that the system investigating the crime did not primarily see him as a victim.

Instead, he might be seen as evidence of a “homosexual problem.”

That may sound absurd today, but it reflects the reality of how the Canadian Armed Forces understood sexuality during the Cold War.

The language used in the investigations involving the babysitter  and Captain Father Angus McRae reveals something uncomfortable about that era. The institutions responsible for investigating abuse were operating inside a framework where homosexuality itself was treated as deviant, dangerous, and incompatible with military life.

When abuse involved male victims, that framework blurred the line between predator and victim.

The Cold War Purge and CFAO 19-20

Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and into the early 1980s, the Canadian military treated homosexuality as both a disciplinary problem and a national security concern.

This belief was written directly into policy.

One of the most significant instruments was Canadian Forces Administrative Order (CFAO) 19-20, which governed the investigation and removal of personnel suspected of homosexual conduct.

CFAO 19-20 existed within a broader Cold War purge that targeted homosexuals across Canadian government institutions, including:

• the Canadian Armed Forces

• the RCMP

• the federal civil service

The logic behind the policy was rooted in Cold War paranoia. Officials believed homosexuals could be blackmailed by foreign intelligence services, particularly by Soviet agents.

As a result, the military created investigative structures designed to identify, interrogate, and remove suspected homosexual personnel.

The policy environment produced several consequences:

• homosexuality was framed as a threat to institutional integrity

• investigators were trained to detect homosexual behaviour

• once the label appeared in an investigation, it influenced how everything else was interpreted

That mindset shaped how the military reacted when allegations of abuse surfaced on a Canadian base.

The “Fruit Machine”: The Era’s Most Bizarre Investigation Tool

The Cold War purge of homosexuals produced one of the strangest devices in Canadian intelligence history.

It was known as the “Fruit Machine.”

Developed during the 1950s and used by Canadian security services, the device attempted to identify homosexuals through physiological testing.

Subjects were shown images of men and women while sensors measured:

• pupil dilation

• perspiration

• heart rate

Investigators believed these physical reactions could reveal sexual orientation.

The concept was deeply flawed and scientifically dubious. But for years it was treated seriously by Canadian security officials.

The existence of programs like this shows how strongly the Canadian state believed homosexuality posed a threat to national security.

Inside that mindset, sexual acts between males were rarely interpreted in neutral terms.

They were treated as signs of deviance, corruption, or institutional danger.

The Criminal Code Language of the Era

The legal vocabulary used in the McRae investigation also reflected the Criminal Code provisions that existed in Canada during the late 1970s.

Several sections governed sexual activity between males.

Among them were:

Section 155 – Buggery

This provision criminalized anal intercourse except in narrow circumstances.

Even after partial decriminalization reforms in 1969, the offence remained illegal under many conditions and carried heavy stigma.

Section 157 – Gross Indecency

This section criminalized a broad range of sexual conduct between males that did not meet the definition of buggery.

For decades it was widely used by police to prosecute same-sex behaviour.

Section 149 – Indecent Assault on a Male

This offence criminalized sexual assault involving male victims.

Although this section addressed abuse directly, the surrounding legal environment still framed male-male sexual activity primarily as a criminal phenomenon.

When investigators documented the acts committed by Captain McRae, the terminology used in military court records echoed this Criminal Code language.

Terms appearing repeatedly in the documentary record include:

• buggery

• gross indecency

• homosexual acts

• immoral conduct

The problem was that this vocabulary did not clearly separate sexual orientation from sexual abuse.

Both were described using overlapping terminology.

When Abuse Was Interpreted as a “Homosexual Problem”

Once the investigation entered that legal and institutional framework, the narrative could easily shift.

Instead of focusing exclusively on the exploitation of children, the investigation often framed the events as part of a broader issue involving homosexual behaviour on the base.

This pattern appears across multiple records connected to the scandal, including:

• CFSIU investigative files

• court martial transcripts

• ecclesiastical disciplinary proceedings

• administrative military documentation

Within these records, the abuse of boys by an adult priest was frequently described using the same legal language applied to consensual homosexual acts.

That distinction mattered enormously.

Because once the discussion centred on homosexuality, the victims themselves could become entangled in the stigma surrounding it.

When Victims Inherited the Stigma

In a military culture that treated homosexuality as deviant or dangerous, the presence of sexual acts between males could cast suspicion on everyone involved.

That included the children.

Investigative language sometimes described victims using the same legal vocabulary applied to the perpetrator.

In practical terms, this meant that boys who had been manipulated or abused could be perceived not purely as victims, but as participants in behaviour that the institution viewed with suspicion.

For children living in military communities where homosexuality was widely condemned, that label carried enormous social consequences.

The stigma surrounding homosexuality acted as a shield that protected abusers while simultaneously harming the victims.

The Interrogation Culture of the Era

Another piece of the historical puzzle that modern readers often miss is how suspected homosexual behaviour was investigated during the Cold War.

Investigations conducted by military police, intelligence officers, and sometimes the RCMP were not limited to simply asking questions.

They often involved aggressive interrogation techniques designed to identify sexual networks.

Individuals suspected of homosexual behaviour could be subjected to prolonged questioning about:

• their personal relationships

• sexual experiences

• private social circles

• other individuals who might also be homosexual

Investigators frequently attempted to build lists of names, treating suspected homosexuals as part of a hidden network that needed to be uncovered.

In that environment, the goal of the investigation was often not simply to determine whether a crime had occurred. The goal was to expose what investigators believed to be a subculture operating inside the military.

When abuse cases involved male victims, this investigative mindset could create dangerous distortions.

Instead of focusing exclusively on the conduct of the adult offender, investigators might treat the situation as evidence of a wider homosexual environment.

That perspective could easily shift attention away from the central fact that a child had been exploited.

When Military Social Workers Misinterpreted Trauma

The same cultural attitudes sometimes appeared in child welfare systems connected to military communities.

During the 1970s, 1980s, and into the 1990s, military psychological and social work literature still contained deeply flawed assumptions about male victims of sexual abuse.

One of the most damaging beliefs was the idea that boys who had been abused by males might develop “homosexual tendencies” or that sexually abused boys would go on to become “pedophiles”.

In some cases, abused boys were not simply treated as victims of trauma. Instead, professionals attempted to interpret their experiences through theories about sexual orientation.

This could produce disturbing conclusions.

Rather than asking why a child had been targeted by an abuser, military personel sometimes focused on whether the child’s behaviour indicated the development of homosexuality.

For boys already living in military environments where homosexuality was heavily stigmatized, this interpretation could be devastating.

It meant that the very systems meant to help them sometimes reinforced the idea that they themselves were the problem.

How These Attitudes Shaped the Narrative

When these investigative and psychological assumptions combined, they created a powerful institutional blind spot.

Investigators trained to search for homosexual networks, combined with social theories that linked abuse to sexual orientation, could unintentionally reinforce a narrative that obscured the central issue.

The question that should have been asked was simple:

Who harmed these children?

But in the cultural environment of the time, the question often drifted toward something very different:

What kind of sexual behaviour is happening here?

That shift in focus allowed the stigma surrounding homosexuality to seep into the way victims themselves were perceived.

The Result: Victims Trapped in the Wrong Story

For boys caught inside that system, the consequences could last for decades.

Instead of being clearly recognized as victims of sexual abuse, some were implicitly drawn into the same moral category as the adults who exploited them.

The institutional narrative blurred the line between:

• victim

• witness

• participant

That distortion did not simply affect how cases were investigated.

It shaped how those events were remembered, documented, and interpreted long after the original investigation ended.

And once that narrative became embedded in official records, it could follow the victims for the rest of their lives.

A System That Could Not See Clearly

Looking back at the records today, the most striking feature is how deeply institutional language shaped the investigation itself.

The system struggled to clearly distinguish between:

• homosexuality

• sexual misconduct

• sexual abuse of children

When those categories blurred together, the truth became harder to see.

The abuse did not occur because of these policies.

But the policies influenced how the abuse was interpreted, documented, and remembered.

Why This Still Matters: The Echo in the 2011 CFNIS Investigation

The legacy of these attitudes did not disappear when the Cold War ended.

Decades later, when historical abuse allegations resurfaced and were investigated again by the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS), the institutional framework surrounding the case was still shaped by the earlier narrative.

Historical records, investigative summaries, and institutional memory all originated in an era where the language of homosexuality had shaped the original investigation.

When modern investigators reviewed those records, they were inheriting a documentary trail that had already been filtered through that lens.

The consequences of those early interpretations did not vanish with time.

They became embedded in the archival record.

And those records continue to shape how the events are understood today.

The Lesson Hidden in the Documents

The documents surrounding the McRae scandal reveal more than the actions of individual offenders.

They expose the institutional mindset of an era.

Cold War policies like CFAO 19-20, the Criminal Code provisions governing same-sex behaviour, and the broader purge of homosexuals from Canadian institutions created a framework that distorted how abuse was understood.

Within that framework, the most important fact could become obscured:

Children had been exploited.

Understanding that institutional context is essential for understanding why some victims were not recognized, believed, or protected when the events first came to light.

And why the consequences of those failures continue to echo decades later.

Why Institutions Still Struggle With These Cases

Understanding the cultural and legal environment of the 1970s and early 1980s raises an uncomfortable question.

If the investigative framework of that era blurred the line between homosexuality and sexual abuse, what happens when institutions are asked to revisit those cases today?

For organizations like the Canadian Armed Forces, the answer is complicated.

Re-examining those investigations does not simply require reviewing the conduct of individual offenders. It requires confronting the possibility that the institutional mindset of the time contributed to the harm experienced by victims.

That is a much more difficult admission.

Acknowledging it would mean recognizing that the policies, assumptions, and investigative methods of the era may have distorted how abuse was understood and documented.

It would mean admitting that victims may have been misunderstood, stigmatized, or even implicitly blamed because of the framework through which investigators interpreted the events.

For large institutions, that kind of realization carries consequences.

It raises questions about:

• the fairness of past investigations

• the accuracy of official records

• the treatment of victims

• and the institutional culture that shaped those outcomes

These are not merely historical questions.

They affect how modern investigators interpret archival records, how institutions respond to survivors today, and how the public understands what happened in the past.

The Weight of the Archival Record

Another difficulty lies in the nature of the records themselves.

Investigations create documents.

Those documents become files.

Those files eventually become the historical record.

But if the original investigation was shaped by flawed assumptions, the record it produced can carry those assumptions forward.

Later investigators reviewing those files may believe they are reading a neutral account of events.

In reality, they may be reading a narrative already filtered through the institutional attitudes of another era.

That means the past can quietly shape the present.

Not through deliberate deception, but through the simple persistence of documents created within an outdated framework.

A Story That Was Never Fully Told

When the scandal involving the babysitter  and Captain Father Angus McRae surfaced at CFB Edmonton, it exposed a serious problem.

Children had been exploited.

But the institutional language used to describe the events often framed the situation differently.

Instead of clearly identifying abuse, the narrative frequently drifted toward discussions of homosexuality, morality, and deviant behaviour.

In that environment, victims could become entangled in the stigma attached to the very acts committed against them.

The story that ended up recorded in official documents was therefore incomplete.

It described acts.

It described investigations.

But it did not always clearly describe the children as victims of exploitation.

Why This History Needs to Be Understood

Revisiting these events today is not about rewriting history.

It is about understanding the context in which that history was recorded.

The Cold War policies that governed the military, the Criminal Code language that framed sexual acts between males, and the investigative culture of the time all shaped how the scandal was interpreted.

Without understanding those factors, it is impossible to fully understand the documentary record that remains.

And without understanding the record, it becomes much harder to recognize the experiences of the victims whose lives were shaped by those events.

The Real Lesson

The story surrounding the McRae scandal ultimately reveals something larger than the actions of any single individual.

It shows how institutional assumptions can shape the way abuse is perceived, investigated, and remembered.

When the framework used to interpret events is flawed, the truth can become distorted long before it reaches a courtroom, an investigative report, or an archival file.

For the children who lived through those events, the consequences of that distortion have lasted for decades.

Understanding the mindset of the era does not change what happened.

But it helps explain why the full story took so long to emerge.

And why some parts of it are still difficult for institutions to confront.

A Personal Note About Why This Matters

For me, this history is not abstract.

I was one of the children living on the base when these events unfolded. Like many of the boys who became entangled in the investigations that followed, I grew up inside a system that did not clearly distinguish between abuse and the stigma attached to homosexuality.

The labels and assumptions of that era shaped how adults interpreted what had happened, how institutions documented those events, and how some of the children involved were viewed afterward.

The purpose of examining these historical records today is not simply to revisit an old scandal. It is to understand how the investigative framework of the time shaped the narrative that was ultimately written into official documents.

Only by understanding that framework can we fully understand the record that remains.

The Power of Secrecy.

At first glance the 1980 investigation of Captain Father Angus McRae looks like a typical military scandal from another era. But the real story is not about one officer or one investigation. It is about the system that surrounded them. The military police, the investigators, and the legal authorities responsible for the case were all operating inside the same chain of command that governed the base itself. That was not an accident. It was how the National Defence Act was designed to function at the time.

When the Investigator Talks: The Forgotten Structure Behind the 1980 CFB Edmonton Investigation

In November of 2011 I had a conversation that would later become surprisingly important.

The man I spoke with was Warrant Officer Frederick R. Cunningham, the former Acting Section Commander of the Canadian Forces Special Investigation Unit (CFSIU) Western Region. Decades earlier he had been tasked with investigating Captain Father Angus McRae during the 1980 sexual abuse scandal at CFB Edmonton (then CFB Namao).

Cunningham did not speak to me as a stranger repeating rumours.

He spoke as the investigator who had been assigned to the case.

Within weeks of that conversation I raised what he had told me with the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM) as part of my complaint regarding the handling of my 2011 CFNIS investigation.

What happened after that is worth examining closely, because it reveals something about how the Canadian military justice system actually worked in 1980.

The Base Security Officer: The Hidden Gatekeeper

To understand the structure of the 1980 investigation, you have to understand the role of the Base Security Officer (BSO).

At CFB Edmonton that position was held by Captain David Pilling.

The BSO was not merely a staff officer concerned with physical security. In the Canadian Forces of the 1970s and early 1980s, the BSO was the officer responsible for coordinating serious investigations on the base and supervising the military police detachment.

In practice this meant that when a serious criminal matter arose, the process often flowed like this:

Incident occurs

Base military police become aware

Base Security Officer assesses the situation

Special Investigation Unit assistance is requested

In the McRae case, the CFSIU file shows that Captain Pilling personally tasked WO Cunningham with investigating McRae.

This detail matters because it reveals where the investigation actually began: inside the base command structure.

Command Authority and the Investigation

The base commander at the time was Colonel Daniel Edward Munro.

Colonel Munro was not just the commander of the base.

He was also Captain McRae’s direct superior officer.

This created a structural reality that is easy to overlook today.

The investigative chain began within the same command environment that included the officer being investigated.

The sequence looked something like this:

Colonel Munro – Base Commander

Captain David Pilling – Base Security Officer

Base Military Police

CFSIU investigators (including WO Cunningham)

Even though specialized investigators were brought in, the investigation itself was triggered and coordinated through the base command structure.

This was not unusual for the era.

It was how the system was designed to function.

A System Built Around Command Authority

The Canadian military justice system in 1980 was governed by the National Defence Act as it existed before the major reforms of the late 1990s.

Under that framework, commanding officers exercised enormous influence over disciplinary matters.

They could:

• receive and assess allegations
• determine whether charges should proceed
• decide whether a case would move toward court martial or be handled in other ways

Military police were not institutionally independent in the way civilian police services are today.

They were embedded within the military chain of command.

This meant that when allegations arose involving an officer within the base hierarchy, the investigation inevitably unfolded within that same command structure.

The Conversation in 2011

In November 2011 I spoke with WO Cunningham about the historical investigation.

What he described to me reflected his position inside the original investigative machinery.

He spoke about:

  • the investigative direction
  • the involvement of legal officers
  • the dynamics surrounding the McRae court martial
  • that the activities of Captain McRae were uncovered due to the military police investigation of my babysitter.
  • that it was a command decision to not call in the RCMP to handle the investigation of the babysitter.
  • that it was a command decision to keep the McRae matter in the military justice system instead of handing it off to the civilian courts.
  • that it was a command decision to limit the number of charges brought against Captain McRae.

These were not abstract opinions. They were observations from someone who had been positioned inside the investigation itself.

In December 2011 I raised what Cunningham had told me in a complaint sent to the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal.

The Institutional Response

In January 2012 I received a response from the Provost Marshal’s office stating that the Professional Standards review had concluded that CFNIS investigators had acted appropriately.

The letter also included a strikingly narrow statement:

The review found no indication that military police in the 1980s were aware of incidents involving me personally.

This wording is significant.

It does not say that military police were unaware of abuse occurring on the base.

It only states that investigators were unaware of incidents involving me specifically.

That distinction leaves open a much larger question about what investigators knew regarding other victims and events at the time.

In his January 2012 response, which came less than one month after I informed the Provost Marshal of my conversation with Fredrick R. Cunningham, Deputy Commander Lt.-Col. Gilles Santerre concluded that he could find no evidence that the military police in 1980 were aware of incidents involving me personally. 

That statement may be technically correct in the narrowest possible sense, but it sidesteps the far more important fact that the individual I have long identified as the person who molested my brother and me was already under investigation by the base military police in 1980 for sexually abusing the children that he was babysitting. According to both former SIU investigator Fred Cunningham and the father of babysitter, it was this very investigation into the babysitter that led investigators to uncover the activities of Captain Father Angus McRae. In other words, the military police did not need to know my name to know that children on the base were being abused. The investigation that ultimately exposed McRae began precisely because those abuses were already being reported.

Also, Bobbie Garnet Bees became my legal name in the mid ’00s. The CFNIS were aware of my legal change of name and what my name was during the time of the abuse. I wouldn’t be surprised if the Provost Marshal and the CFNIS only searched the 1980 files for my current legal name and not my birth name. If it ever came to light at a later date that my name was in fact contained in the 1980 military police investigation of the babysitter or the CFSIU investigation of Captain McRae, the CFPM and the CFNIS could say “ooops, sorry, we honestly forgot about your change of name”.

The Curious Silence in 2016

Several years later, during a later phase of the investigation, CFNIS investigators attempted to contact Cunningham.

His response was notable.

He declined to participate in a recorded interview and refused to meet investigators in person. Instead, he spoke briefly by telephone and avoided giving detailed answers.

This was a stark contrast to the way he had spoken with me in 2011.

Why Cunningham became so cautious remains unclear.

But the timeline raises an obvious possibility.

After my complaint reached the Provost Marshal in December 2011 and included information Cunningham had shared, it is entirely possible that he was advised to avoid discussing the investigation further.

If that occurred, it would explain why he became extremely careful when investigators contacted him again years later.

The Official Secrets Act and the Security of Information Act allow the Canadian Armed Forces to control what information becomes public and what information is never to be discussed with the public.

A Structural Problem, Not a Conspiracy

The purpose of examining this structure is not to claim that a conspiracy occurred.

The issue is structural.

The system that existed in 1980 placed investigations, command authority, and disciplinary decisions within the same organizational chain.

When serious allegations arose involving members of that chain of command, investigators inevitably had to operate within an environment influenced by the same hierarchy.

This was precisely the kind of structural problem that later inquiries into the Canadian military justice system criticized.

Reforms implemented after the Somalia Inquiry were intended to create a clearer separation between investigators and the command authority whose members they might be required to investigate.

The Larger Question

Looking back at the McRae investigation today raises a simple question.

When a serious criminal investigation begins inside the same command structure that includes the accused officer, how independent can that investigation truly be?

The answer to that question is not found in speculation.

It is found in the structure of the system itself.

And that structure is preserved in the documents that still exist today.

Below is a closing section you can append to the blog post. I wrote it so it ties the command structure, the National Defence Act flaw you’ve been analyzing, and the chilling effect of secrecy laws together in a coherent way. You can trim or sharpen the tone to match your usual style.

The Structural Flaw Behind It All

When you step back from the personalities involved in the 1980 investigation, a larger structural problem comes into focus.

The issue is not simply that the investigation occurred on a military base, or that the accused officer was part of the command structure.

The issue lies in how the National Defence Act operated before the reforms of the late 1990s.

At the time, the Code of Service Discipline effectively placed the entire disciplinary process under command authority. Commanding officers were not merely supervisors. They were central actors in the decision-making process that determined how allegations would proceed.

They could influence whether:

• allegations were pursued as service offences

• charges were referred for court martial

• matters remained within the military system

• civilian police were notified

This arrangement created what can only be described as a prosecutorial bottleneck.

Every major decision flowed upward through the chain of command.

In the McRae investigation, the chain of command ran directly through Colonel Daniel Edward Munro, who was both the base commander and the direct superior officer of the accused.

Even though specialized investigators such as the CFSIU were brought in, the investigation itself still originated inside that command structure through the Base Security Officer.

The system was not designed to isolate investigators from command influence. It was designed to operate within the command structure itself.

That distinction matters.

Because when serious allegations involve individuals within that same hierarchy, investigators inevitably find themselves operating in an environment shaped by the very authority structure connected to the case.

Silence Through Secrecy

There is another layer to this story that is rarely discussed.

Investigators and military personnel operating in this environment were also bound by the Official Secrets Act, legislation that imposed strict legal obligations regarding the disclosure of information obtained through official duties.  

The Act criminalized unauthorized disclosure of government information connected to official service.

For someone like Warrant Officer Frederick Cunningham, who served as the Acting Section Commander of the CFSIU Western Region during the McRae investigation, this created a powerful constraint.

Anything he learned during the investigation was information acquired through official duties.

Speaking openly about those events decades later could potentially be interpreted as revealing protected information related to military operations, investigations, or internal decision-making.

Even if the events themselves occurred decades earlier, the legal obligations imposed by secrecy legislation do not necessarily expire simply because time has passed.

The result is a quiet but powerful chilling effect.

Former investigators may possess direct knowledge about how an investigation unfolded, but the legal environment surrounding them discourages open discussion.

In many cases they may simply decide that remaining silent is the safest course of action.

The Problem With Silence

When secrecy laws intersect with a disciplinary system controlled by command authority, an unintended consequence emerges.

The people who know the most about how an investigation actually unfolded are often the least able to speak about it.

Investigators such as Cunningham may possess firsthand knowledge of the investigative environment, the legal advice involved, and the decisions made during the case.

But decades later, those same individuals may feel legally constrained from explaining what they witnessed.

This creates a situation where the historical record becomes shaped almost entirely by institutional documents and official summaries, rather than the voices of the investigators who actually worked the case.

Why This Matters Today

The Canadian Forces eventually recognized the dangers inherent in this structure.

The reforms that followed the Somalia Inquiry were designed to strengthen the institutional independence of military police investigations and reduce the influence of the chain of command over criminal matters.

Those reforms did not appear out of nowhere.

They were a response to the realization that the previous system placed investigators in a position where command authority, legal control, and secrecy obligations intersected in ways that could obscure the full truth of events.

Looking back at the 1980 investigation through this lens reveals something important.

The question is not simply whether individuals acted correctly or incorrectly.

The deeper question is whether the system itself was designed in a way that made full transparency almost impossible.

And when the structure of the system makes transparency difficult, silence becomes the natural outcome.

In the end, the McRae investigation tells us less about individual decisions than it does about the design of the system itself. The pre-1998 National Defence Act concentrated investigative power, prosecutorial control, and command authority inside the same chain of command. When serious allegations arose within that chain, the system was forced to investigate itself. That is not simply a historical curiosity. It is a design flaw. And like any flaw built into the foundation of a structure, its consequences were not always visible at the time, but they were inevitable.